
FINAL EVALUATION REPORT

REAL TIME EVALUATION OF PLAN INTERNATIONAL'S RESPONSE TO TYPHOON HAIYAN, PHILIPPINES



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INTERNATIONAL ADVISORY, PRODUCTS AND SYSTEMS



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TABLE OF CONTENTS

TABLE OF CONTENTS	2
PROJECT IMPLEMENTATION DETAILS	6
ACRONYMS AND SPECIALIST TERMS	7
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY	9
INTRODUCTION	11
The evidence base for this report.	12
THE CONTEXT	16
The Disaster Context	16
The Plan Context	17
The challenge of disasters for Plan	18
PREPAREDNESS.....	20
Preparedness and Preparedness	20
Preparedness at the community level.....	21
Findings.....	22
SYSTEMS	25
The Plan Emergency Response Manual.....	25
National and International Staff and broader HR issues.....	28
Exit interviews	32
Demands (and Support) from the Plan Family	32
Invest in ICT support including NetHope	34
Findings.....	35
COORDINATION	37
Engagement with the international humanitarian community	37
Engagement with Government.....	38

Partnerships.....	38
Findings.....	38
SAFETY	40
Safety in the Typhoon.....	40
Other Safety and Security issues	40
Findings.....	41
SUPPLY CHAIN.....	44
Plan's logistic capacity	44
Findings.....	45
COMMUNICATION	47
A great success	47
Exploitative media requests	47
Findings.....	48
PROGRAMME.....	49
Appropriateness	49
Joint Needs Assessment	50
Delivery	51
Findings.....	52
FUNDRAISING.....	54
Fundraising.....	54
NO Fundraising.....	54
Findings.....	56
ACCOUNTABILITY.....	57
Accountability.....	57
Monitoring.....	57
Findings.....	58

APPENDIX: TERMS OF REFERENCE: REAL TIME EVALUATION OF PLAN INTERNATIONAL'S RESPONSE TO TYPHOON HAIYAN, PHILIPPINES, DECEMBER 2013	59
1. Background	59
2. Evaluation Purpose.....	60
3. Stakeholders.....	60
4. Evaluation objectives and key questions	60
5. Evaluation Deliverables and Timeline.....	62
6. Evaluation Team	63
7. Roles and Responsibilities:.....	63
APPENDIX: AREAS IN WHICH PLAN IMPLEMENTED THE RESPONSE	66
APPENDIX: EVALUATION MATRIX.....	69
APPENDIX: METHODOLOGY	74
Underlying standards.....	74
Key informant interviews (including telephone interviews).....	74
Group interviews with plan staff.....	75
Group interviews with the affected population	75
Document review.....	75
Observation.....	76
On-line survey.....	76
Sampling strategy.....	77
Fieldwork	77
Triangulation.....	78
Data coding and analysis.....	78
APPENDIX: PERSONS MET	80
APPENDIX: INTERVIEW GUIDE	85
APPENDIX: ON-LINE SURVEY	87

REFERENCES	92
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Cover Image: NOAA Image showing the eye of Typhoon Yolanda arriving at Tacloban.

ACRONYMS AND SPECIALIST TERMS

Acronym	Meaning
A/LM	Administration and Logistics Manager
AM	Area Manager (responsible for several PUs)
AS	Area Supervisor (responsible for part of a PU)
C&A	Children and Adolescents
CD	Country Director
CDRG	Country Disaster Response Group
CFM	Country Finance Manager
CM	Communications Manager
CMT	Country Management Team
CO	Country Office (plan office that runs programmes)
CO	Country Office
CPA	Country Programme Advisor
DOA	Delegation of Authority
DPP	Disaster Preparedness Plan
DRM Advisor	Disaster Risk Management Advisor
ER	Emergency Response
ERM	Emergency Response Manager
ERMT	Emergency Response Management Team
GA	Global Assurance
GAD	Grant Agreement Document
GFM	Global Finance Manager
GIK	Gift in Kind
GOA	GAD open to all. A GAD which is open to all NOs to contribute to
GSM	Global Support Manager
GTS	Grants Tracking System
HCT	Humanitarian Country Team
HR&OD	Human Resources and Organizational Development
HR&ODM	Human Resources and Organizational Development Manager
ICT	Information Communications & Technology
ICTM	Information Communications & Technology Manager
IH	International Headquarters
IH DRM D	International Headquarters Disaster Risk Management (Director)
IH F	International Headquarters Finance
IH HoS	International Headquarters Head of Security
IH ICT	International Headquarters Information and Communications Technology
IH IO	International Headquarters Information Officer
IM	Information Manager
IO	Information Officer
M,E&R	Monitoring, Evaluation & Research
NO	National Organisation (Plan National Office that raises funds)
NO	National Organisation
PH	Republic of the Philippines

<i>PIM</i>	Programme Implementation Manager
<i>PO</i>	Project officer
<i>PPM</i>	Programme and Projects Module
<i>PSM</i>	Programme Support Manager
<i>PU</i>	Programme Unit
<i>PUM</i>	Programme Unit Manager
<i>RD</i>	Regional Director
<i>RDRMM</i>	Regional Disasters Risk Management Manager
<i>RFM</i>	Regional Finance Manager
<i>RL</i>	Regional Logistics
<i>RMM</i>	Resources Mobilization Manager
<i>RNA</i>	Rapid Needs Assessment
<i>RO</i>	Regional Office
<i>RO CM</i>	Regional Office Communications Manager
<i>RO DRM</i>	Regional Office Disaster Risk Manager
<i>RORM</i>	Regional Office Response Manager
<i>RSA</i>	Regional Security Advisor
<i>RSC</i>	Regional Sponsorship Coordinator
<i>SOP</i>	Standard Operating Procedure
<i>VOR</i>	Virtual Operations Room

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

Real time evaluations of humanitarian interventions provide an opportunity to review Organizational response effectiveness through a review of administrative, programmatic and system-wide functions through snapshot in time. This report captured significant input for the review through an initial desktop research of global ERM and Haiyan specific resources available through Plan's virtual operations room. Further, it captured significant evidence to inform the report through a variety of methods and approaches described later in the report during the fieldwork phase in February and additional telephone interviews with key staff during the first part of March 2014.

It should be noted that many of the observations and findings outlined have already been corrected by Plan PH and others are being remedied at the time of delivery of the report. Nevertheless, the report provides a solid view of the main barriers and challenges faced as well as processes that functioned well through the initial phase of Plan's response to typhoon Haiyan. These lessons learned provide a concrete foundation for what may need to be addressed to improve future emergency responses of this magnitude.

The evaluation presents findings only – as such the necessary course of action to address these should be determined by Plan's senior management team. The evaluation relied heavily on interviews (individual and group) with 145 persons and 126 responses to an on-line survey as well as observation of programmatic processes and sites during the field visit. The large mass of evidence (over 2,200 individual data points) was weighed and analysed by the team to generate the results presented. The Evaluation team leader relied on nearly 30 years' experience of humanitarian response in analysing the evidence presented in the report.

Successes

The Plan response to Typhoon Haiyan was very successful on many fronts. Plan's previous investments in corporate preparedness proved to be essential. Plan was able to mobilise large amounts of resources quickly from donors, and a number of NOs raised significant amounts of funding for the response. This was due in great part to Plan's programmatic reach prior to the typhoon and the excellent relationships it had developed with the affected communities. Further, this was coupled with a great relationship with the donor community, and the Philippines government at all levels.

Plan's ability to engage in coordination at different levels and advocate for full engagement by UN-led coordination structures with the government allowed it greater visibility as an effective emergency response agency. Plan's response also featured the One Plan Policy and approach which in many ways allowed functioning as a cohesive entity. The One Plan Policy approach paid off in resource mobilisation, communication, and in the vast range of international deployments to the Philippines.

Further, Plan's previous disaster response experience and geographic reach provided for timely needs assessments and subsequently—multi-sector programmes that were broadly appropriate to the needs of the affected population.

Barriers/Constraints

It should be noted that no emergency response goes without problems. Some of the issues identified, such as the lack of good quality information at the onset, are generic to humanitarian action, but others were exacerbated by the orientation of Plan's systems (and of some staff) towards regular development programming. Plan's effectiveness was stymied due to a lack of appropriateness of Plan's procedures for an emergency response, where speed was of the essence. Plan faced particular challenges in logistics, HR, and project management structures throughout the initial phase of the response to Typhoon Haiyan.

The success of resource mobilisation exposed problems in programme management and implementation. The attempt to use the regular development business model to manage projects proved inefficient due to the large number of projects on hand. The attempt to have programme advisors fill in programme management roles was not successful. Clear management structures were not established during the initial phase, and many staff were left confused about their exact roles in the programmatic process. It should be noted that this is not unusual in emergency responses, but this remained a major problem for program operations for a significant amount of time.

Although the personnel surge was impressive, it was not necessarily timely. The roster system did not prove very useful in providing staff required. Local recruitment was also slow, partly due to the lack of a HR manager for more than a year prior to the Typhoon. This was further exacerbated by the lack of proper emergency response procedures and lack of clarity on the direction of the response in the initial phases.

In addition, the emergency response highlighted the lack of logistical capacity within Plan. Procurement, dispatch, warehousing, and tracking all proved to be challenges. It should be noted that other organisations faced similar problems initially, but were able to set up proper logistics systems more rapidly. The lack of logistical capacity led to several assessments not being followed through to meet the needs of beneficiaries and/or other agencies meeting the needs unmet by Plan.

Programmatic design did not take into account the fact that volume of projects were placing a burden on Plan's limited logistical capacity. Some projects included aspects that were complex and did not account for overstretched management and personnel resources. An overemphasis on relief goods contributed to many logistical challenges that could have been defrayed through more emphasis on cash programming. This also contributed to a broken monitoring system for projects which lacked staff and/or well thought out tracking mechanisms to determine programmatic progress.

Further, Plan lacked a robust security management system which was evidenced by the lack of a formal system for assessing and controlling security risks. This lack of capacity resulted in variable briefings of incoming staff on standard operating procedures and security protocols.

Despite these flaws Plan's in the response the evaluation determined that appropriate assistance was delivered to the affected population and that existing investments in Preparedness had been leveraged to deliver an effective response. Further, the evaluation determined that under the circumstances, Plan's assistance was broader and more comprehensive when compared to other agencies.

INTRODUCTION

This evaluation report is for a real time evaluation of the Plan response to Typhoon Haiyan in the Philippines. A Real-Time evaluation takes place at the early stage of a response and is intended to be a light exercise with a minimal load on the operation. See the ALNAP RTE Guide (Cosgrave et al., 2009).

As this report will show, Plan Philippines has done a formidable job in responding to Typhoon Haiyan given the complexity of the response. Based on the evaluation we were able to determine that Plan raised significant funds for the response, and was able to provide much needed assistance to communities targeted.

However, Plan's achievements and accomplishments were not without challenges. The evaluation revealed that internal systems and procedures were not always up to par in the words of one interviewee, were not necessarily "fit for purpose" in the context of a large scale emergency response. The major barrier was Plan's initial lack of logistics capacity at the CO level, and lack of capacity at the Global level to support the response. Other systems such as Human Resources were also not adapted for the speed needed in the emergency response phase.




Figure 1: How well did the Country Office cope? Source: on-line survey

Figure 1 shows how survey respondents viewed the performance of the Country Office in the response. More than 80% of respondents from outside of Plan PH agreed with the statement that the CO coped better than could be expected within a very challenging context.

This was an emergency of an unprecedented scale in the Philippines. While relatively few Programme Units were affected, Plan staff lost family members, homes and work-spaces. The communication systems, which Plan had relied on, were not functioning after the Typhoon, and this made operations more difficult.

Readers of this report should understand that no Country Management Team can fully deal with all of the issues that arise in a large disaster response of this size and scope. The time requirements for all the normal functions increased five or ten-fold and new functions were added on. Managers at organisations like Plan, with a "family" structure, face even more work due to the complexity of internal relations. Even with perfect systems all of this places an enormous burden on the country team, and it is simply not

possible to cover all requirements. In the case of Plan some of the internal systems were described as "broken" or "not fit for purpose" which imposed an even bigger burden on the country team.

Any emergency response requires managers to make choices about what to prioritise. It must be emphasised that in retrospect, it is always easy to state what has gone wrong. However, such analyses rarely highlight the fact that if management had paid attention to issue A, then issue B would have had received less attention. Thus, this report highlights issues that should be addressed in future response rather than what should have happened in the past. For instance, if Plan PH had put a lot more resources into solving the logistics capacity and constraints, it may have decreased Plan's resource mobilisation capacity and ability to support donor relations.

While this report seeks to answer the evaluation questions set in the Terms of Reference, the main focus was looking at how the Country Office managed to do so well in a very challenging context. What factors contributed to this, and what factors limited Plans ability to deliver?

The report is structured around nine chapters following the structure of the questions in the ToR (although some questions have been moved to better suit the flow).

THE EVIDENCE BASE FOR THIS REPORT.

The evidence on which this report is based is largely drawn from interviews with Plan staff and the online survey. A small number of external persons were also interviewed. The methods used are described in the Methodology Appendix. Overall, 145 people were interviewed and 126 responded to the on-line survey. There was some overlap between the two categories.

The team used an evidence table to record data as it was collected. Over 2,200 evidence data points were entered in the evidence table, organised under 31 different issues, and 10 different categories, which form the basis of this report. The issues were drawn from the original evaluation questions presented in the terms of reference plus seven additional issues (HR, DRR mainstreaming, Gender, Lessons, Changes needed, General comments, and what people would do differently the next time).

Not all pieces of evidence have the same weight. The team weighed the evidence offered by individuals based on three factors.

- The extent to which the position of the respondent enabled them to make a grounded summary judgement. Thus the views of the Barangay Council in relation to the extent to which they were consulted have greater weight than the views of the Plan staff doing the consulting.
- The level of experience of the respondent (where comparative judgements were offered). Thus more weight was attached to the views of staff with multi-agency emergency response experience on the effectiveness of Plan logistics, than to those with more limited response.
- The presumed bias of the respondents. For instance, much more weight was given to deployed staff saying that the Philippine staff were welcoming than to Plan PH staff saying the same thing.

The issue of presumed bias arises also in terms of the issues for which people offered comments. There were five separate comments on the payment of per diem for national staff. Some negative feedback

about pay and conditions is to be expected and national staff would have preferred per diem. However, the substantive issue raised by those commenting was not the per diem itself but the inconsistencies around per diems, with per diems for internationals, but not for nationals, except for one week in December 2013. There was strong evidence for the lack of a clear and consistent benefits policy communicated to national staff.

Assessing the weight of different pieces of evidence was considered where there was some significant conflict in the evidence. There was relatively little conflict in the evidence around what had happened. The biggest conflicts were about what should happen in future, or how the problems identified could be addressed.

Weighing evidence also took place with the numerical survey results. In the online survey, 63% percent of Plan PH staff agreed or completely agreed with the statement "*The lack of context knowledge of some temporary duty international staff led to programming problems*". In turn, only 33% of internationally deployed staff agreed with this. However, responses from Plan PH staff were given far greater weight in the analysis as:

- Their familiarity with the context should enable them to quickly spot inappropriate programming.
- The international staff who lacked context knowledge, would also have lacked the knowledge needed to identify programming errors.

Each piece of evidence was a snippet of text, ranging from one (the comment "demoralized" in response to a survey question) to 381 words (also from a survey comment). The evidence set forms the base on which the evaluation team made their analysis.

Table 1: Summary of the depth of evidence by category

Criteria	Pieces of evidence	As %	Words
Systems	820	37%	24,911
Learning	409	18%	13,181
Supply chain	239	11%	5,674
Programme	201	9%	3,790
Fundraising	171	8%	3,060
Coordination	136	6%	2,915
Preparedness	126	6%	2,969
Safety	58	3%	1,102
Communication	51	2%	1,092
Accountability	27	1%	491
Total	2,238	100%	59,185

Table 1 shows the breakdown of responses by broad criteria. From it, it is evident that there is very a broad evidence base for the chapter on Systems, and quite a narrow base for the chapter on

accountability. The report reflects this, with more emphasis on systems (including HR and Management generally) than on areas such as accountability. Items from learning were incorporated in the sections to which they relate.

Table 2: Source of evidence by type of source

<i>Source of Evidence</i>	<i>Pieces of Evidence</i>	<i>As %</i>	<i>Words</i>
Plan Philippines staff	918	41%	19,516
Plan RO staff	392	18%	12,035
Plan NO staff	372	17%	12,224
Plan IH staff	229	10%	8,687
Other Plan staff	150	7%	4,060
Affected population	67	3%	817
Government and Politicians	64	3%	1,234
Other NGOs, UN and Red Cross staff	46	2%	612
Total	2,238	100%	59,185

Table 2 shows that the largest single source of evidence was Plan Philippines staff providing 41% of the evidence count. They were followed, in order of the number of evidence data points, by NO, RO, and IH staff. The prevalence of sources from Plan reflects the focus of this evaluation on Plan systems.

Table 3: Distribution of evidence by data collection method

<i>Data collection method</i>	<i>Pieces of Evidence</i>	<i>As %</i>	<i>Words</i>
Online Survey	944	42%	32,931
Telephone interview	523	23%	12,867
Semi-structured Interview (two or more interviewees)	390	17%	6,182
Semi-structured Interview (Individual interviewee)	230	10%	3,723
General meeting	117	5%	1,781
e-Mailed comments	21	0.9%	1,524
Detailed discussion (>10 minutes on one or more topics)	11	0.5%	146
Observation	2	0.1%	31
Total	2,238	100%	59,185

Note: The number of observations was low as observations were usually recorded as part of the interview record rather than as separate observations.

Table 3 shows that the largest single source of evidence as comments from the on-line survey, followed by telephone interviews (of which there were 19 in total, some of them lasting nearly an hour). The appendices contain a list of persons interviewed.

The reason for presenting the depth of evidence is to enable the readers to understand that the findings in the report are based on what interviewees told the evaluation team either directly or through the survey or other documents reviewed.

When writing the report, the team leader reviewed all the evidence on a particular criteria, and where there are conflicts, has considered the probability of differing agendas, and the depth of knowledge that a source was likely to have.

THE CONTEXT

THE DISASTER CONTEXT

On November 8, Tropical Cyclone Haiyan, known as Typhoon Yolanda in the Philippines, made landfall in Guiuan, Western Samar, Eastern Philippines. The Typhoon, had the highest ever recorded wind speeds, estimated at 315km/h sustained one-minute wind speed.




Figure 2: The track of Typhoon Yolanda and the areas of greatest damage (extract of OCHA map)

The Philippines is affected by many typhoons (the name given the tropical cyclones in the Pacific) and it is estimated that four to six make landfall in the Philippines every year. However, most of these have been far weaker than Typhoon Haiyan. The typhoon led to very high loss of life and damage due to:

- The storm surge – driven by both the low pressure raising local sea level and the wind pushing water ashore. The deadliest storm surge on record was that associated with Cyclone Nargis, which killed over 140,000. Storm surges¹ can be quite high. The storm surge for Hurricane Katrina was around 8m high (NOAA, 2012, 2013). The height of a storm surge depends on a range of factor, including the intensity of the storm, the slope of the sea-bed, the shape of the shore etc. Run-on heights for the surge (the height seen on land) can be higher than the surge height due to a range of factors.
- Tacloban also saw a meteo-tsunami. These are rare tsunami-like events caused by metrological phenomena. Eye witnesses in Tacloban spoke about four large waves sweeping in (Woodworth, 2014).
- High winds, destroying buildings, coconut trees and other crops, creating a hazard to life through the volume of material projected at high speed by the wind.
- Flooding, both from the storm surge and from intense rainfall. The flooding destroyed lines of communication and other physical infrastructure.

All of these elements contributed to the loss of life and damage caused by this exceptionally violent Typhoon.

THE PLAN CONTEXT

Founded over 75 years ago, Plan is one of the oldest and largest Children's development organisation in the world. Plan works in 50 developing countries across Africa, Asia and the Americas to promote child rights and lift millions of Children out of poverty. In 2012, Plan worked with 84 million Children in 90,131 communities. Plan is independent, with no religious, political or governmental affiliations.

Plan aims to achieve lasting improvements in the quality of life of deprived Children in developing countries, through a process that unites people across cultures and adds meaning and value to their lives, by:

- Enabling deprived Children, their families and their communities to meet basic needs and to increase their ability to participate in and benefit from their societies
- Building relationships to increase understanding and unity among peoples of different cultures and countries

¹ Storm surges are such a common feature in the Bay of Bengal that cyclone shelters there are two storey buildings where people take refuge on the second floor.

- Promoting the rights and interests of the world's Children.

One of Plan's priorities (approved by the Board in 2009) is that 'Children and youth will realize their right to protection and assistance in emergency situations.

THE CHALLENGE OF DISASTERS FOR PLAN

Historically, Plan has worked long-term with communities in Programme Units (PUs). Plan has used child sponsorship to fund multi-sector community development projects in these PUs. Over the last decade, Plan has increasingly accessed grant funding for different projects. About half of Plan's total financing now comes from sponsorship, with the remainder coming from grants, including grants from NOs. Grant funding operates differently (with accountability to the granting institution) from child sponsorship funding. While sponsorship funding is relatively stable, grant funding is very variable and has more stringent accountability measures.

Disaster response funding is primarily grant aid, and Plan Country Offices (COs) that have large ongoing regular Plan programmes have to adapt to an entirely different approach in emergencies.

What is different about emergency response?

The main difference between regular development programming and emergency responses is the time-criticality of interventions. Faster response significantly reduces the risks of death and suffering in the affected population. This leads to three main differences:

- First, emergency responses are a lot less consultative than development interventions. Speed of action is often more important than building a consensus for action.
- Second, emergency responses are less cost sensitive than development interventions. Methods such as air transport may be used instead of regular shipping by sea to speed up delivery.
- Third, emergency responses often use a multi-track approach to problem solving rather than a single-track approach. With a single-track approach, first you try option one, and if that does not work, then option two and so on. With a multi-track approach you try multiple options at the same time, even though this may result in a less efficient use of resources. For example, an agency might contract three different transporters at once to use different routes to reach the affected area, risking oversupply and increased costs. You also try multiple stages at once, rather than waiting for the first stage to complete before beginning the second one. For example, while contracting transporters, an agency might also secure warehousing, even though the agency runs the risk that the warehouse in question will never be used.

Clearly single-track approaches are easier to manage and are more efficient than multi-track approaches, but multi-track approaches have the advantage of producing faster results, though at greater cost.

Plan's great strength is in community development. These skills are very relevant for post-disaster recovery interventions, but are less relevant in the acute relief phase. As a result, Plan does not have a

large reservoir of people with relief skills. For instance, Plan does relatively little food distribution in its regular programmes so is not so well placed for food distribution in emergencies.

Plan has worked well in some emergencies, such as the Pakistan floods (Sandison and Khan, 2010), but has faced significant challenges in others, such as the Haiti earthquake (Alainchar et al., 2010).

Many interviewees commented that the Asia Region is the strongest for Plan in terms of preparedness for disaster response. Plan Philippines is seen as one of the strongest COs in the region, and as one of the best prepared for disaster response. Over the last few years Plan PH has responded to one or more disasters every year in the Philippines including responding to Typhoon Bopha (December 2012) and to the Bohol Earthquake (October 2013, as well as to multiple floods and minor disasters).

PREPAREDNESS

How effective was the disaster preparedness process in establishing Plan Philippines to be ready for all aspects of the response?

PREPAREDNESS AND PREPAREDNESS

There are two broad types of preparedness measures. Measures which are primarily intended to improve the ability to respond to disasters, and measures which are not primarily intended to improve disaster response capacity but also improve the ability to respond. There is also a difference between preparedness measures for communities and preparedness for Plan as an Organisation. The question asked in the ToR is broadly about Plan's institutional preparedness and this is discussed below. The issue of the impact of preparedness work with communities will also be discussed at the end of this section.

Elements of prior preparedness for Plan cited as effective by interviewees and survey respondents included:

- Deployment of staff to municipalities prior to the landfall of Typhoon Haiyan (this was controversial, and will be discussed under the section on Safety and Security).
- Prepositioning relief resources in Programme Units.
- Training of 30 staff members in the Philippines to form part of the Emergency Response Team.
- Increasing the size of the Emergency Response team at IH
- Increasing the size of the Emergency Response team at the RO.
- The focus on DRM and Disaster Management in the COs in the Asia Region generally.
- Disaster simulations in the region, which different staff attended.
- The preparation of the Plan Emergency Response manual.
- The relationship with NetHope.
- The preparation of country level emergency response protocols in 2011 (predating the Plan ER manual).

However, many other measures, not primarily intended to add to disaster preparedness contributed to Plan PH's ability to respond. Elements in this category that were cited by interviewees and survey respondents included:

- Responding to prior disasters. This gave Plan a seat at the table and influence in the UN Humanitarian Country Team. It also meant that Plan had an established relationship with core

humanitarian donors. Plan PH had followed a policy of active engagement in Humanitarian Coordination structures prior to Haiyan, which left it well placed to garner funds and influence the Yolanda response.

- Prior disaster experience. This was seen as having more of an impact on individual preparedness than training, simulations, or the Plan ER Manual. This was highlighted by survey respondents and interviewees. In interviews, staff without prior emergency experience spoke of initial confusion and lack of knowledge of what to do in the absence of an organisational structure; and well defined roles. However they noted that these factors would not be a problem in future, as they now had the emergency response experience and understood how to mitigate issues that arouse in the Haiyan response.




Figure 3: Prior disaster experience was seen by survey respondents as being the most important factor in immediate effectiveness (98 to 108 respondents).

PREPAREDNESS AT THE COMMUNITY LEVEL

In interviews at the Provincial, Municipal, and Barangay level, interviewees made clear that prior preparedness measures had made a difference. Plan PH's own assessment report on DRR notes that *"preparedness actions taken varied greatly across municipalities, barangays and individual households"* (Elegado and Borchard, 2014). The same report notes the challenges faced. The shining example was Llorente municipality which had been supported by the Plan DRR project. Not only did this municipality avoid fatalities, but also sent teams to assist the badly damaged neighbouring Municipality of Hernani. They had already mobilised the team for their own municipality, but when they suffered almost no damage the team was mobilised to the adjoining district.

However, the basic problem faced for preparedness at the community level was the unprecedented magnitude of the Typhoon, which went far beyond local experience with such events. This meant that buildings such as schools and halls that had proved adequate shelters in the past, did not do so in the case of Haiyan. As one interviewee commented: "this was not a typhoon you could hide from".

FINDINGS

Finding: Overall, prior disaster preparedness by Plan, directly through formal measures intended to increase response capacity and indirectly through the capacity developed in responding to previous disasters, contributed to plan's ability to respond and to the quality of the response.

While some Plan PH staff advocated for having a completely separate structure to respond to emergencies, so that they could continue their normal work in the PUs without interruption, this was not realistic for a Red Emergency response. Plan PH has an ER team that was available for smaller disasters, and this enabled Plan PH to respond to these. However, for a Red Level response, the need for surge capacity meant that a far broader range of staff had to be involved.

Surge capacity

One underlying issue for preparedness is the debate on how Plan should surge capacity for disasters. There are many competing models for meeting the needs for surge capacity by using a mix of:

- Partner staff
- National staff
- Roster and non-roster staff from other offices
- External emergency stand-by response staff
- New hires

All of these sources have their own advantages and disadvantages. Plan has very limited emergency stand-by staff. The advantage of a large emergency stand-by structure is that it provides a pool of experienced emergency professionals familiar with norms and standards and current humanitarian coordination architecture able set up a new emergency response within a few days. Even the limited emergency response stand-by staff that IH and the ARO could provide played a significant role in the response. However, there are three disadvantages to having a large emergency response stand-by capacity:

- The cost associated with it, especially given the variable nature of emergencies².
- The separation of disaster response from normal development programming, which can leave national staff feeling that disaster response is not their responsibility. This was evident in Plan PH

² And the existence of an emergency does not mean that a response by emergency stand-by staff will be possible as it the response may be constrained by low levels of funding (South Sudan currently), or by limits on access (Myanmar after Cyclone Nargis).

where some staff felt that disaster response was a matter for the Emergency Response Team and not for regular staff.

- The risk of programming that is not appropriate to the national context. Inappropriate programming has been a constant criticism in evaluations of large humanitarian responses such as the 1999 Kosovo Crisis or the 2004 Indian Ocean Tsunami response.

In some countries Plan works extensively through partners. In such circumstances, partners can redeploy their regular programme staff to respond to emergencies. Partners normally have little un-earmarked funding they can use for capacity building and maintenance³, but function on a project funding basis. Partners can respond most effectively when there has been an investment in their emergency response capacity.

Two constraints on surging with partner staff are: 1) partners often work with a range of funding partners, and those other partners may place demands on them for response capacity; and 2) decisions on the redeployment of staff have to be made through the partner's own processes, which may slow decisions about deploying Plan's own staff. This can slow down response in the early in the early stages where there are typically many changes in emergency response plans.

Typically, organisations that work extensively through partners for their development programmes, such as Oxfam or Tearfund, have invested in external emergency stand-by response staff for the initial part of the emergency response⁴, and only move the weight to partners at later stages of the response.

Plan PH has relatively few partners, but had some 280 staff prior to Haiyan. This gave Plan a large pool of national staff from which to draw. Nearly half of these were deployed and made a large contribution to the response. Using existing Plan national staff gave Plan greater control over the response. It also means that programmes were more likely appropriate and in line with the national context.

However, the staff who have had not had previous emergency experience or training were less useful initially than those who had such experience or training. Plan PH staff themselves said in interviews that they could have been more effective at the onset of the disaster, if they had had prior emergency experience or training.

Plan PH made extensive use of staff from other offices. Only some of these were formally on the emergency response roster. The limitations of this kind of surge are that the most competent staff from other offices are usually critical to their own office's operations and can only be spared for limited

³ The difficult issue with capacity building is capacity maintenance. Training staff not only increases the capacity of the organisation, but also makes the staff more attractive to other organisations. This means that capacity building is not a one off process, but needs repeated inputs.

⁴ Tearfund has a dedicated Disaster Response Team and Oxfam has dozens of Humanitarian Support Personnel.

amounts of time. Nevertheless, the evaluation identified this type of surge capacity as an overall strength which made a large contribution to Plan's response. One risk with using such staff is that they are not always aware of the country context, and this may lead to programming that is not appropriate for the national context⁵.

New hires, both national (extensive) and international (limited) were used by Plan PH to meet surge capacity requirements. Some of the issues involved will be discussed in the systems chapter. Issues that arise from hiring to meet surge capacity is the inevitable lead time that recruitment takes, and the fact that the new hires are not always familiar with the way in which Plan works. The surge mix in the Philippines was heavily reliant on existing Plan PH staff (particularly when one uses person months as a basis of comparison).

Finding: Much of the corporate preparedness work undertaken by Plan served to increase surge capacity.

Finding: Personnel surge for the Haiyan Response was inadequate in terms of numbers and existing skills to match the speed of resource mobilisation.

Finding: The ability to use Plan's existing national staff for response gave it a competitive advantage over other agencies given their familiarity with the context and experience of working closely with communities and the local authorities.

The precise surge mix that Plan uses for any emergency response is for Plan senior management to decide. The main point here is that all the different types of surge require investment. Pools of staff can only serve as sources of effective emergency surge if there is a commensurate investment in their capacity: whether by investing in developing the emergency response capacity of Plan, partner staff; more effective rosters, stand-by staff, or rapid recruitment. The balance of this investment is a matter for Plan senior management to determine.

Finding: Plan PH positioned itself very successfully as a humanitarian response agency in the Philippines through its work with relatively minor disasters, including those that occurred outside of existing PUs.

Previous experience contributed to the training of a (low) number of Plan PH staff. More importantly, it led to the perception, within the humanitarian and donor community, of Plan as an experienced and effective humanitarian responder. Such positioning works well where there is a humanitarian coordination structure, as there was in the Philippines. This will be discussed further in the Coordination chapter.

⁵ In the online survey 63% percent of Plan PH staff agreed or completely agreed with the statement that "*The lack of context knowledge of some temporary duty international staff led to programming problems*".

SYSTEMS

Have the staff involved in the response followed Plan's procedures for emergency response (as set out in the emergency response manual) and were the procedures in the Manual appropriate to the requirements of a response of this scale?

How did the national and international teams complement each other and what was done to promote effective integration?

To what extent did other Plan Offices address Philippines needs for the typhoon response?

Did the demands from Plan family limit or detract an effective response?

Was Plan's investment in ICT support (including the hosting of Nethope) appropriate to the challenges of this disaster?

Note: the question on addressing needs has been shifted from this section to Programming to improve document flow. This section also addresses broader HR issues.

THE PLAN EMERGENCY RESPONSE MANUAL

The Plan Emergency Response Manual is a recent document. It was introduced as a draft in 2012 and a revised version was issued in 2013. The Manual is divided into three volumes

- Book 1 is a relatively short guide that sets out the Plan colour-coded emergency alert response categories (Green – No emergency, Yellow – High Hazard Level; Orange 1 – Localised disaster with a response in one PU; Orange 2 – Nationally significant Disaster anywhere in the country; Red – UN Level three disaster with global media significance; and Blue – Post emergency recovery or protracted emergency). The guide is designed to enable Plan staff to understand which activities should be carried out at each alert level. It also details the expected outcomes, available resources on PlaNet, and guiding principles (WHAT).
- Book 2 gives details on who executes the activities listed in Book 1. It gives more details on how this will be done (WHO and HOW). There are a number of functions under which specific expectations are outlined depending on the alert level.
- Book 3 covers six core programme chapters (Education in Emergencies; Child Protection in Emergencies; WASH; Food Assistance and Nutrition; Camp Management/ Shelter and Non-Food Items; Health; and crosscutting issues like Gender-Based Violence, Psycho-social Support, Cash

Programming, among others). It gives guidance at different levels, from disaster preparedness to post-emergency close-out.

The Green alert levels sets out a range of organisational preparedness measures – see Table 4

Table 4: The Eleven Preparatory Measures specified for Administration, Procurement, and Logistics in Vol. 2 of the Plan ERM

1. Identify and create an emergency suppliers database: Suppliers should be identified both at CO and PU levels and in neighbouring countries. Sector advisors will advise on quality of required items.
2. Formalise pre-agreements with key suppliers for rapid response and distribution during the emergency: Pre-agreements should include these key elements: sustained prices, open credit lines, prepositioned stocks, storage, transport, contract prioritization, etc. Agreements and contracts are reviewed on annual basis.
3. Identify and define technical and quality specifications for pre-selected items and assemble kits per sector: Sector advisors will support in defining quality and technical specifications and kit composition
4. Identify spaces to be used as storage offices and accommodation in case of emergency: For large-scale and high-destruction disasters such as earthquakes and hurricanes/cyclones, alternatives spaces in which to run offices, accommodations, and storage should be identified in safe places
5. Ensure the administration, update, and care of inventories in stores and warehouses located in CO and PUs: At PU level, PMs should take responsibility for the inventories and care of storage equipment and items. Inventories are updated on quarterly basis
6. Conduct mapping of means of transport and routes in locations where Plan works: Mapping should always include various alternatives of transport means and access routes
7. Collect, update, and disseminate information related to customs points, services, and import-export procedures: Information to include available infrastructures and associated costs for budgeting purposes Analyse safety and security of Plan's installations and offices and implement preventive measures
8. Set up abbreviated procedures for purchases and contracts in emergencies: For more in depth information, go to Plan's Logistics Quick Guide
9. Become familiar with template plans for all phases of the disaster response programme: Key templates for Assessment are found in the Initial Rapid Needs Assessment tool and Procurement, Transport, Storage and Distribution templates in Plan's Logistics Quick Guide
10. Support set-up of procedures to manage cash in CO and PUs offices

11. Design templates and mechanisms to assess damage in Plan's offices after a given disaster

It is evident that if the measures specified in the manual for Green Alert had been carried out they would have helped Plan PH avoid some of the problems seen in the response.

The level of familiarity with the manual varied greatly. Senior staff, and those from the Regional Office and the International Headquarters were familiar with the ER Manual. However unit managers in the Philippines were not familiar with the Plan Manual. However, it should be noted that they were familiar with the Plan Philippines procedures for emergencies which are parallel to procedures in the manual.

One interviewee highlighted that the procedures in the ERM and the associate Emergency Logistics Guide were not yet approved by the Organisation. This was in specific reference to accelerated procurement procedures.

Only 16 Plan PH staff said that they were familiar with the ERM, and of these 12 said that they had used it in the response. By contrast 51 non-PH staff said that they were familiar with it and 37 said that they had used it. However, as a general rule, non-PH staff were in advisory rather than management roles, making their knowledge of the ERM processes more academic at times.




Figure 4: Familiarity and use of the manual (source: online survey)

Figure 5 show that those claiming familiarity with the manual rated it quite highly. Responses to whether the manual needs revision or was missing several critical areas were much more nuanced.




Figure 5: Views on the Emergency Response Manual: Source: on-line survey. Response only included from those agreeing or strongly agreeing that they were familiar with the manual.

There was no broad consensus on which part of the manual was most useful. It depended on the position of the responder and their previous experience. In general, there was agreement that Book 2 provided useful checklists. There was disagreement about the utility of Book 3 with less experienced staff welcoming the guidance and more experienced staff arguing that Book 3 needed substantial revision.

Suggestions for improving the Manual included shortening it, making greater use of checklists or Book 3, and even presenting the key concepts as a set of playing cards so that staff become used to them.

NATIONAL AND INTERNATIONAL STAFF AND BROADER HR ISSUES

The issue of potential sources for staff surge was discussed in the preparedness chapter. Plan Philippines had over 280 staff prior to Typhoon Yolanda. About half of these were deployed to support the emergency response and others (in Manila or who remained in post at affected PUs) also participated in the response.

In addition 106 staff from outside the Philippines were deployed as part of the response in 127 separate deployments (to 24 February 2014). International staff were made to feel welcome and integrated well into the team in the Philippines, a view that emerged strongly in both the survey and interviews with the staff.




Figure 6: Differing perceptions among Plan PH staff and staff from other offices (numbers of respondents for each element shown) – source on-line Survey.

Figure 6 shows that both national and international staff agreed that they worked well together, with only a few dissenters. Both agreed that new hires did not get an adequate briefing from Plan. The lack of briefings on roles and management structure was an issue commonly reported by deployed staff, including Plan PH staff deployed from within the country and staff deployed from other countries. Some senior national staff who remained in place were unsure what their roles were in the response.

The reasons why incoming staff were not briefed were complex:

- HR were already overburdened with national and international deployments.
- The focus of senior management was elsewhere. Emergency responses require a great deal of unanticipated work ("fire-fighting") on problems that arise in the response.
- Some of the issues that staff noted that they were not briefed on, such as the organisational structure for the response, had not been decided.

While this could be seen as a criticism of the Country Management Team in Manila it must again be emphasised that even within perfect systems, no Country Management Team can possibly deal fully with all of the different issues that arise in a large disaster response. Some issues inevitably are not prioritised.

The two areas where there was a significant difference between the views of Plan PH staff and International staff deployed were the following:

- Whether the lack of context knowledge among internationally deployed staff led to programming problems – 60% of Plan PH staff agreed with this, but just over one third of internationally deployed staff agreed.
- The extent to which some temporary duty staff added little to the response – 70% of Plan PH staff agree and only 50% of internationally deployed staff did.

In both cases, the views of Plan PH staff were more compelling than those of International staff deployed. However, overall, both Plan PH staff (80%) and international staff deployed (87%) agreed that international deployments brought essential skills to the response.

The one sustained criticism of international deployments was that some were too short (two weeks being given as a common timeframe). A month was frequently specified as the minimum required. However, the approach of the Christmas Holiday Season served to limit deployments. There is a difference between deployments for resource mobilisation, which can be shorter, and those, which involve programming on the ground (which should be at least a month).

Again, the longest average deployments (apart from new international hires) were for staff from other country offices.

Sources of International Deployments to Plan Philippines (only first deployment counted)




Figure 7: Where deployed staff came from. Source: Capacity tracker spreadsheet.

Analysis of the roles of deployed staff is difficult, as many fulfilled several different roles even in short periods. Interviewees spoke of acting as resource mobilisers, needs assessors, and then project support staff during their deployments.

Many Plan NOs had sent staff to a Plan meeting on Disasters in Bangkok that was due to start the Monday after the Typhoon. Several of these staff had booked themselves out for longer to visit Plan offices in the region. This meant that there was a ready pool in the region of NO and RO staff who were familiar with disaster response and national donors funding emergency response. However, Plan management exercised careful control over which staff travelled on to the Philippines to ensure that the CO was supported rather than swamped.

While the availability of these staff in the Region was coincidental, it was based on Plan's investment and commitment to DRR and building DRM capacity. International deployments in the early stages drew heavily on these NO and RO staff. IH support typically took about a week longer to mobilise than RO staff. Staff from other COs played a larger role as time went on—the need for visas for staff from other Plan countries was probably a factor in this.

Further, Plan Philippines operated a One Plan policy for those deployed and were informed that they worked for Plan Philippines rather than the NO that deployed them. NO interviewees were in agreement with this policy and noted that it gave them much wider exposure to the response.

Most deployments to the Philippines were not on the Plan internal roster or the roster of external consultants. The Roster was described as being a "mess", "broken", or "not fit-for-purpose" by different interviewees in the Philippines who had attempted to secure staff from the roster. The internal roster was found to be out of date and said to contain staff who had left Plan. One reason suggested for this was that 10 Roster member from the UKNO left Plan in November/December and it may not have been updated.

The roster contained names with little description of skills or key areas of expertise other than their main technical field of expertise. Another issue was that staff on the Roster were not necessarily available when requested, due to family or work commitments. Managers in Plan PH were very frustrated with the roster.

In all, 43 Plan staff deployed to the Philippines were roster members and another 4 were deployed through roster coordination. However the initial deployments of some of the roster members, such as those attending the Bangkok meeting, were not handled through the roster. It wasn't until two weeks into the response that IH began to get roster requests. Up until then ARO was trying to fill the vacancies from resources in the region. Staff were deployed as individuals, whereas interviewees noted that what was needed for a Red emergency were functioning teams. Staff can only deploy as teams if they train as such during simulations.

One constraint identified was the lack of a HR manager in Plan PH. The position had been vacant for a year despite several hiring rounds and attempts to fill the vacancy. However, the Regional Office acted promptly in deploying a HR manager with emergency experience. Despite the huge amount of work done by the HR team to identify candidates for local employment, this did not translate into the quick filling of

gaps in the expanding emergency response staffing structure. The reason appears to be that there was a reappraisal of actual staffing needs in mid-December with a consequent delay in recruiting.

Plan PH recruits candidates to fill specific positions. At the Country level, and especially during emergency responses, where the number of personnel needed may change, it may have been advisable to recruit to a pool of approved candidates, with qualifying candidates in excess of immediate need being maintained on the panel for a year or more and told that they will be contacted if Plan had another opening.

The structure of normal Plan programmes in the Philippines is flat. Technical specialists were removed from Programme Units in 2011, and concentrated in the Area Support Office under the Area Manager. This means that the Programme Units, apart from some support staff, were limited to the Programme Unit Manager, Area Supervisors, and Community Development Facilitators. While this structure was adequate for long-running development programmes it posed problems for the emergency response.

More technical specialists are needed in emergency response

The introduction of new projects and new approaches often requires some technical input, in both development and relief contexts. However, emergency relief responses usually entail implementing a large number of new projects, and may require new approaches. An increase in technical specialists is usually required when compared to development programmes. Some humanitarian response projects (such as constructing water points) also have an inherent need for technical expertise.

EXIT INTERVIEWS

Exit Interviews are a rich source of learning. Staff can often be more frank at Exit Interviews than in other exchanges. Exit Interviews refer to interviews on exit from the response or from a particular role in the response and not just to departures from Plan. Deployed staff, whether national or international, should be interviewed at the end of their deployment, or with any major role change in their deployment.

Given the enormous load on the HR section, it was not surprising that Exit Interviews were generally not conducted by HR. Exit interviews should be managed by HR officers not involved with the recruitment process, so that the interviewee can be frank about issues around their own recruitment.

Further, Plan PH needs a system for capturing the learning from such interviews and using it to improve the programme. The lack of exit interviews may be one of the reasons why so many deployed respondents to the on-line survey for this evaluation made very detailed comments.

DEMANDS (AND SUPPORT) FROM THE PLAN FAMILY

Interviewees and survey respondents often commented that the Haiyan response was very much a One Plan response in that all the different components worked well together. The CO made a determined effort to have staff from NOs work on more than their own grants.

Perceptions of interviewees and survey respondents were largely positive about the support from NOs, the RO, and IH.




Figure 8: Perceptions of support from other offices (with the number of respondents)

The results were broadly positive. It should be noted that in all surveys there is a bias towards agreement with the statement shown, so negative expressions like "too demanding" attract more agreement than if the statement were phrased in a positive way. Thus, when considering responses what is important is the level of disagreement with the statement. In all of the answers presented in Figure 8, 12 to 20 respondents indicated that they could not answer the question (typically including comments that they could not do so as they were from that office, or had no dealings with it).

The fact that NO staff were in Bangkok and could be deployed immediately greatly reduced the volume of communication from the NO to the CO as the NO staffer in place could answer the questions themselves. Under normal circumstances, it would have taken longer for NO staff to deploy.

Plan PH staff were in stronger agreement with the statement that NOs were sometimes too demanding. However the worst example of NO demands was the issue of Gifts in Kind (GIK). The donation of drugs from the CNO took up valuable time in the CO, even after the NO was directed to the Ministry of Health. Given that in Asia many goods are available at a fraction of their price in developed countries, GIK donations often make little sense. This is especially true when the cost of clearing goods (with a good chance that they will accrue demurrage or storage charges due to bottlenecks at airports).

Plan PH developed a GIK list within two weeks. However, Plan PH did not have the technical skills needed to manage specific GIK donations. For example, pharmacy specialist are typically required to deal with drug logistics as there are so many pitfalls—including local regulations, expiry dates, and restrictions on particular products. One NO donated medicines directly to the Ministry of Health when Plan PH declined to receive the donation. However, the Ministry of Health did not process the donations and Plan PH then faced calls to assist in getting the donations out of customs.

Another GIK contribution was a donation from Irish Aid. The items donated were from the prepositioned Irish emergency stock at the UN Humanitarian Response Depots, but not all the items were ideal in the Philippines context.

While some elements (such as the tarpaulins⁶) were very useful, other elements, such as the tents, had quality issues, or posed problems for Plan. One such problem item was the water transport and distribution kits, which Plan PH did not have the skills to use. While Plan PH staff are familiar with WASH projects, they were not familiar with emergency WASH items. However, the rapid availability of the Irish Aid items was appreciated and considered useful.

INVEST IN ICT SUPPORT INCLUDING NETHOPE

The CO provided a lot of support to NetHope, not only facilitating the import of equipment, but also facilitating access to this equipment by other NGOs and Local Authorities. One example of good practice

⁶ The Irish Aid tarpaulins were more useful than other donors tarpaulins because they were supplied with ropes that could be used to fit to tarpaulins as temporary shelter or to repair roofs etc.

was the provision by Plan of an internet hub for other NGOs in Borongan. The ARO IT staff were already based in the Philippines, making IT support much easier.

Plan faced more problems with its own ICT equipment in the early days. Although Plan PH had satellite phones in stock, they did not always work and keeping them charged was a problem.

FINDINGS

Finding: Plan staff responding to the Emergency were not always familiar with the manual and subsequently procedures were not always followed. As procedures were not followed, there is no practical evidence as to whether the procedures in the manual were appropriate.

It should be noted that the manual is relatively new and that staff can be expected to become more familiar with it over time. The use of the manual for simulation exercises, and linking reporting on Manual preparedness levels are two ways in which staff can become more familiar with the manual.

Finding: The Emergency Response Manual was identified as a good resource by those familiar with it. It was seen as providing a good foundation in Plan emergency response.

Finding: The third volume of the manual attracted the greatest amount of attention in terms of comments around improvement.

As noted previously, Plan faced some difficulties in scaling up staffing for the Haiyan response.

Finding: The lack of a head of HR in Manila for over one year led to some delays in the mobilisation of staff for the Haiyan Response.

The lack of a HR manager is far more critical for an emergency response than for regular development programmes. Not having a HR manager in place at the start of an emergency response placed Plan at a disadvantage in terms of the use of one of Plan's key advantages—its existing staff.

Finding: Plan PH and International staff deployed worked well together. Further, International Staff added value to the response.

Finding: Reducing the number of technical staff to the bare minimum needed for regular programming can later constrain the implementation of emergency response projects.

The removal of technical specialists from the Programme Units in 2011 thinned Plan PH's staff resources for responding to emergencies.

Finding: The Plan roster system did not work well.

Plan relies in part on an emergency roster to provide surge staff for emergencies. Deploying individuals from the roster proved difficult as they had other priorities. The roster database contained only limited data on the available skills of the members, making identification of suitable staff difficult without referring to their CVs. Some of those whose details were on the roster were no longer working for Plan.

Finding: Plan recruitment was slow, both nationally and internationally. The Plan PH HR team used accelerated procedures to try and speed up local recruitment.

Finding: Some Plan national staff at the field level felt that their opinions were not taken into consideration in the response.

During fieldwork, it became clear that Plan national staff considered that the response did not make much use of their views and experience.

Finding: The Haiyan Response was a good example of what Plan can achieve when all segments works together under a One Plan Policy.

Several elements of the response (resource mobilisation, personnel mobilisation and communication) functioned as One Plan members rather than members of different offices.

Finding: Plan PH did not make sufficient use of exit interviews to learn lessons.

Exit interviews can provide management with indications of what areas need improvement and often with suggestions as to how they can be improved.

Finding: Plan PH proved the NetHope concept in the response

The relationship with NetHope proved very useful and gave Plan a pivotal role in the early stages of the response, through the facilitation of communication for other NGOs and for the Government. It also gave Plan International a seat in the Global ICT Cluster. Plan PH proved the concept for future disasters.

Finding: Plans PH's emergency standby communications preparations were inadequate.

Plan's own communications capacity after the disaster was challenging. Satellite phones were distributed but either worked poorly or did not have chargers that allowed them to be used in an environment where there was no mains electricity.

COORDINATION

Has Plan's representation and involvement in UN and government (local and national) coordination processes added value to Plan and to others?

Is Plan's engagement with local government appropriate and effective?

Have Plan established sufficient, appropriate and effective partnerships (with local and international organisations and private sector) to deliver programmes effectively? Did Plan make enough of the opportunities that were available?

ENGAGEMENT WITH THE INTERNATIONAL HUMANITARIAN COMMUNITY

Plan PH had exceptionally good engagement with the international humanitarian community and was the INGO representative on the UN's Humanitarian Country Team (HCT). Due to Plan PH's response to earlier disasters in the Philippines it was already well known to the humanitarian arms of major donors active in the Philippines.

Keeping engaged with other actors takes constant effort, but proved beneficial for Plan PH both in terms of influence and the ability to mobilise resources. All of this engagement gave Plan PH a lot of visibility with the international community in Manila. Further, it contributed to the ability of Plan PH to mobilise resources.

The multiplicity of coordination structures at national, regional, and in some instances the sub-regional level, proved challenging for Plan, as it did not have the number of technical specialists needed to participate in coordination at all of these levels as well as providing advice or implementing projects. This was a particular issue with WASH where Plan undertook to provide a WASH cluster coordinator for East Samar but was unable to do so, as the staff member was not released from other responsibilities. Participation in cluster coordination requires technical staff. Being a cluster lead is a full-time job if done well.

Participation in the cluster requires a physical presence and time, as there are always side-meetings and the need to feed the coordination machine with data and information. Assigning the same staff member to participate in the cluster at different locations imposes a difficult travel load. Plan should recognise that participating in the cluster coordination system imposes an additional burden on other staff requirements. Interviewees reported that Plan's engagement with the cluster system at the central level was good, but was more variable outside of Manila. This reflected both the number of coordination venues, and the scarcity of technical staff in Plan PH who could be spared to participate in different coordination fora.

ENGAGEMENT WITH GOVERNMENT

Plan PH had excellent engagement with all levels of government (with the possible exception of the regional structure), from national down to the Barangays. This was clear in the role that Plan has played at the national level, and at the Provincial level.

The Philippines has an unusual government structure, in that Municipalities do not get their budget from the Province, but from the national government. They may get funding for particular provincial programmes from the provinces—however, this arrangement limits the authority of the provincial government with the Municipalities. It also makes the Municipalities much more important players than in a structure where Municipal budgets are controlled by the Province.

PARTNERSHIPS

The Preparedness chapter commented on the implication of using either partner or Plan staff for surge in the emergency response. Plan PH implements programmes directly for regular community development programming, although some projects outside the PUs are implemented with partners. Direct implementation meant that Plan PH was at an advantage with a large staff pool (over 280 before Haiyan) to draw on for the emergency response. The down side is that Plan could not in parallel draw on the capacities of implementing partners to respond to emergencies.

Plan has a number of broader partnerships, but these vary greatly in their scope and in the nature of the relationship. Plan has, for example, a partnership with Accenture, and hoped that Accenture would be able to mobilise some staff to provide back-office support for the response. However, despite an initial expression of interest by Accenture, detailed discussions with the CO, and the presence of tens of thousands of Accenture employees in the Philippines, it did not prove possible to mobilise Accenture staff to assist with the Plan response.

Other partnerships included the partnership with ShelterBox and NetHope. The ShelterBox tents were acknowledged to be of very good quality, but the need to wait for ShelterBox representatives for distribution slowed down the distribution. Also ShelterBox tents were considered to be too small by families, and had no Plan visibility.

The NetHope partnership was seen as broadly positive. This is discussed under the ICT section of the previous chapter.

FINDINGS

Finding: Due to the efforts of the CD, Plan PH's had very good engagement with the international humanitarian community.

Plan played a key role in the UN-led HCT.

Finding: Plan PH's positioning in the humanitarian community made resource mobilisation easier.

Plan PH engagement in previous emergencies and efforts led by the CD, pre-positioned Plan well with major donors in country.

Finding: Plan lacked personnel available to fully engage within the cluster coordination system.

Cluster coordination requires technical specialists who have the time to engage with the cluster. Cluster leadership is even more demanding in terms of the time commitment needed

Finding: Plan's engagement with local authorities was both appropriate and effective.

Plan had very strong relations with Municipalities and enjoyed good relations at Barangay and Provincial levels.

Finding: Not all of the partnerships established by Plan worked well in the Haiyan Response.

Partnerships are not free. They involve effort and costs on Plan's part, and only worthwhile if they deliver value to Plan.

How effectively were issues of staff safety and well-being addressed?

SAFETY IN THE TYPHOON

Many national staff interviewed by the team considered that some national staff had their lives put at risk by Plan, as their managers had deployed them to affected municipalities in advance of the Typhoon. Staff in East Samar were deployed to Municipalities to provide Plan's communication room in Borongan with up-to-the-minute information on the Typhoon. However, the high winds associated with the Typhoon led to the failure of communications even before the typhoon made landfall. The loss of communication even before landfall meant that the staff could not fulfil the role.

Staff were deployed to support the municipalities which had previously been supported with a DRR programme. They were also deployed to support the operation of the Municipal Disaster Risk Reduction Council. Plan also had pre-positioned some emergency response materials at the municipalities.

The evaluation team concluded that some staff were at risk from the Typhoon. The dramatic footage on YouTube, taken by a Plan staff member deployed to Hernani municipality prior to the Typhoon illustrates this⁷. Staff deployed to Salcedo municipality had a very narrow escape when the Typhoon swept the roof from the Plan office. Staff were deployed to municipalities in South Leyte (not affected by the Typhoon) and in East Samar. In North Samar the PUM decided to concentrate staff at Headquarters rather than in Municipalities.

National staff felt that Plan had not abided by the stated "Safety First" policy in all instances. They stated that they were not rescuers or first responders and that they had no particular role in the immediate aftermath of the disaster. However, Plan PH did benefit from being with the local authorities during the Typhoon. This resulted in strengthened relationships with Municipal officials who recognized Plan's presence before, during and after the Typhoon. Plan staff were instrumental in assisting municipal authorities with organising distributions of Plan stockpiled items and those stockpiled by the Department of Social Welfare.

OTHER SAFETY AND SECURITY ISSUES

Staff deployed to Leyte were initially concerned as the Media had been running stories about looting and criminal activity in areas affected by the Typhoon. They were relieved to be based in BayBay on the West Coast of Leyte rather than closer to the affected areas on the East Coast of Leyte.

⁷ This can be viewed at <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=rS0gv4Xbw7w>

Staff were also concerned about the boat journeys they were required to make for assessment and distribution at Islands off the coast. In some cases these involved boat journeys of up to five hours.

On vehicle safety, the Plan drivers assigned to the evaluation team generally drove well and did not raise concerns.

Two examples of best practice from Plan were:

- The provision of counselling for staff affected or traumatised by the Typhoon.
- Contracting a group from the University of Manila to conduct a health and safety review.

International staff arriving in the Philippines found significant variability in the quality of the security briefings they received. Some received none at all, other described the briefing they got as 'laughable', but more recent arrivals were happy with the quality of the briefings they received. The sole Plan PH security officer at the time accompanied one Plan National Director to Tacloban, leaving no one to brief new arrivals. The Evaluation team got a security briefing on arrival in Tacloban (about half-way through fieldwork).

There was no evidence of strong safety and security protocols or procedures. Not all Plan vehicles had seatbelts for all seats, nor were they fitted with fire extinguishers or first-aid kits. This is evidence of a broader lack of attention to safety.

The evaluation team noted the following concerns:

- Long hours of work were the norm both in Manila and the field. Long hours of work can pose several safety risks.
- Some of the offices (BayBay and Borongan) were several hours from the municipalities targeted for interventions, requiring long hours of driving. At the time of the evaluation Plan was addressing this by setting up new bases in or adjacent to targeted municipalities.
- Some staff reported that the Tacloban office, which was flooded, had been quickly cleaned. However, the offices still contained equipment destroyed during the flooding, awaiting write-off. The long-term effects of exposure to flooding are not well understood, but there was concern that exposure to places and goods that have been flooded but not thoroughly cleaned may give rise to respiratory illness.

FINDINGS

Finding: Plan PH staff in general did not receive proper briefings or training to help them personally deal with disasters.

For example, relatively few staff had any first-aid training and offices and vehicles did not contain first-aid kits.

Finding: Plan PH national staff emphasized that proper attention was not given to staff safety in relation to the deployment of some staff to municipalities in advance of the typhoon.

Plan PH staff in East Samar and South Leyte were deployed to municipalities in advance of the Typhoon. They were tasked with supporting the DRR structures facilitated by Plan.

Finding: Plan lacks a robust security policy

Security briefings were neither timely nor adequate. While this may not be critical for much of the Philippines, this approach could prove fatal in many other humanitarian crises. In many humanitarian crises, the disruption to the normal way in which society operates may lead to increased security risks. Thus environments which normally pose little risk can pose significant risks after a disaster strikes.

A Robust Security Policy: What it means

A robust security policy implies that Plan takes active consideration of staff security and:

- Assign responsibility for staff security in different geographical areas to different staff in a transparent manner.
- Analyse security threats and advise staff of changes accordingly (similar to the security phase concept used by the UN and many humanitarian organisations).
- Train staff in basic security and managers in security management. Many organisations now have their own security guides. Generic resources include the Humanitarian Practice Network guide⁸ and the ECHO generic security guide⁹ and a training guide¹⁰. These could be used to develop Plan security guides for different countries. Organisations such as RedR can assist with the security training of staff.
- Adopt context-appropriate security practices.
- Brief new staff and visitors on security threats in the environment.
- Control access to potentially insecure environments. Management need to be able to identify the location of staff in insecure environments at all time and balance the risks and benefits with having staff there.

⁸ van Brabant, K., Harmer, A., Stoddard, A., & Haver, K. (2010). *Operational security management in violent environments (revised edition)* (Good Practice Review 8, pp. 323). London: Humanitarian Practice Network.

⁹ The Evaluation Partnership. (2004). *Generic security guide for Humanitarian Organisations: Commissioned by ECHO* (pp. 126). Brussels: DG ECHO.

¹⁰ Jowett, E. (2006). *DG ECHO Security Training Manual* (pp. 56). Brussels: DG ECHO.

Robust security practices ensure that risks to staff are minimised, that reputational risks are controlled, and that staff exposure to risk is consciously balanced against the potential benefits in terms of saving lives and preventing suffering.

Finding: Plan PH staff were working long hours, both in Manila and the field, which ultimately is not sustainable.

If working long hours is the norm, there will be no reserve to draw on in emergencies.

Finding: Plan PH provided counselling for its own staff to help them cope with their experiences during Haiyan and the response. This was an example of international best practice.

Finding: Plan commissioned an external health and safety audit. This was a good approach to identifying the health and safety issues that need to be addressed.

SUPPLY CHAIN

What were the constraints of Plan's logistics capacity?

How could this be addressed to meet programme and funding completion dates?

PLAN'S LOGISTIC CAPACITY

One interviewee commented that the only thing that went well on the logistics front was the prepositioning of resources by Plan. This perception of logistics was widely shared. Prepositioning worked well for Plan, but other logistic elements were not adequate to respond effectively

Plan staff were left frustrated by carrying out assessments and then having nothing to distribute because of logistics issues. Staff complained that they could not go back to communities as they had failed to deliver, and that in some cases other organisations came and distributed where Plan had done the ground work.

Plan has effectively no emergency logistics capacity. There was no regular supply chain that could be strengthened. Procurement for the ongoing programme was managed by general services. Plan PH maintained no warehouses, and when goods were distributed previously, they were distributed on arrival without any intervening storage. Plan PH employed no Logistics specialists, nor were any available on the roster. The normal pattern of procurement was too slow for emergencies, and an accelerated procedure was needed using pre-approved suppliers or procuring without tendering. Plan PH did eventually introduce an accelerated procurement procedure, but this was said not to be in line with corporate policy.

The Philippines is an archipelago. This poses logistics challenges as the ferry links between different islands provide choke points. When there was a huge demand for ferries, some trucks got preference and others were left waiting. Lack of staffers at the ferry port to expedite the trucks with Plan goods, meant delays in clearing goods from the port.

Further, International Logisticians were not sufficiently familiar with the alternatives to the Roll-on Roll-off routes. Admittedly these alternatives were more complex – trucking to a minor port, hiring barges and then shipping to another minor port. Plan PH staff were critical about international logistics staff having been deployed without anyone with local logistics knowledge to assist them.

The grant agreements made with Donors did not take into consideration Plan's lack of logistics capacity. This would not have been a problem if there were a few agreements, but there were many. The Logistics tracking sheet as of 14 March shows 180 different consignments ranging from 1.2 million Aquatabs to a single spring renovation (unclear if a kit or a contract).

Logistics is not a significant part of Plan's regular programmes so it is difficult for Plan to draw on deployed staff with logistics capacity. Even though logistics is now considered to be under control, relief

items were still arriving into the Plan warehouses at the time of the evaluation visit, and the mid-March logistics tracker showed that some items are still in transit or have an uncertain status.

Some staff were surprised to discover that Plan had a logistics manual, but this was neither complete, nor were all the procedures "approved" by Plan.

Mounting a logistics system

What is needed to mount a logistics system in an emergency response?

- Logisticians with experience in managing supply chains. These could be based at the RO or IH level.
- Staff trained in procurement, warehouse management, and distribution. This implies that some existing staff should be trained in these skills.
- Knowledge of potential suppliers, transporters, and warehouse operators. This is part of preparedness.
- Procedures for accelerated procurement. This can form part of the logistics manual.
- Procedures and a paper system for tracking and monitoring supplies from procurement through to distribution. Again, this system can be described in the logistics manual.

FINDINGS

Prepositioning of goods gave Plan visibility with Donors and increased its credibility with the local authorities.

Finding: Pre-positioning relief items worked well for Plan.

Finding: Logistics is an area of weakness within Plan.

In a large emergency response like this one, the normal cargo dispatch and transport systems no longer function as there is too much competition for transport resources. Other organisations employ large numbers of specialist logisticians to provide them with more logistics capacity. Yet others rely on deploying logistics staff from other programmes to support logistics in emergency responses. Plan has neither a significant number of emergency logistics staff or logisticians as part of community development programmes.

Finding: Plan needs to have a better logistics capacity to deal with the early stage of an emergency response.

Logistics is a key part of any early phase emergency response. Disasters typically leave affected families without key assets such as shelter, blankets, clothing, cooking equipment etc. The destruction of water supply systems meant that families had a greater need for water containers both for transport and for

household storage. However, in the Philippines as in much of Asia, there are strong market mechanisms and goods can be available relatively quickly.

Finding: Plan PH gave too much emphasis to relief items and not enough to the potential or cash programming in the Haiyan Response.

Past the initial distribution stage, household needs start to vary significantly depending on the circumstances of the household. Cash allows households to do their own needs assessment and to focus on their priorities. The early estimate by the Dart Team was that it would take 2-3 months for the restoration of markets. Even where there was widespread destruction in municipalities, these municipalities adjoined others which were far less affected and still had functioning shops. Cash programming is not a panacea, but the Philippines has a readily available distribution mechanism through the offices that deal with remittances sent from overseas.

Finding: Plan's Logistics manual is not complete and not well known at the field level. Some of the documents used in the Haiyan response were superior to the templates in the manual.

Greater attention needs to be given to completion of the logistics manual. Further efforts must be put forward to increase logistics capacity and training in manual elements.

Finding: The status of the accelerated procurement procedure developed by Plan PH was not clear in terms of Plan's internal regulations.

COMMUNICATION

To what extent has Plan's media presence enhanced the overall response?

A GREAT SUCCESS

Plan enjoyed a large and effective media presence. This was due to the CD being ready and available for media work, Plan's previous work, and to the valuable support provided by the Plan communications team.

Some of the elements that worked well for communication were:

- Joint teams for capturing material on a One-Plan basis. This was done with a photographic and text team from Sweden and with a Camera team from Finland.
- Providing mechanisms (through Google Documents) whereby NOs could specify what materials they needed. This allowed all of the NOs to see what each other was requesting and the fulfilling of the needs of multiple NOs at once.
- The use of a global key messages sheet for all offices.

Opinions were divided on the utility of the media team from one NO that toured the affected area with a media team without much consultation. Although this provided some material for general Plan communication, the main focus of the media team was on the needs for that particular NO rather than the broader Plan media needs.

There was disappointment with the quality of the material produced by the stringers that Plan PH had identified as possible writers and photographers for the larger response. It was considered by some interviewees that the pre-selection of potential journalists was not sufficiently rigorous.

EXPLOITATIVE MEDIA REQUESTS

Plan is a signatory of the NGO Code of Conduct¹¹. Principle 10 of the code states that "In our information, publicity and advertising activities, we shall recognise disaster victims as dignified humans, not hopeless objects". However staff who had worked on communications in Manila during the response told the

¹¹ SCHR, & ICRC. (1994). Code of conduct for the International Red Cross and Red Crescent Movement and non-governmental organizations (NGOs) in disaster relief. Geneva: Disaster Policy Department, International Federation of Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies.

evaluation team that some media requests (which were not fulfilled) from NOs clearly breached this, with a request for images and videos of crying Children etc.¹².

Another concern was that one NO in particular pressed hard for access to trafficking victims, despite the fact that granting such access might place the victims of trafficking at further risk.

FINDINGS

Finding: Media relations was a success due to the CD's input and the deployment of communications staff from both RO and NOs with the ability to effectively engage with international media.

It should be noted that most of the country team was not comfortable with doing media interviews. As a result the CD has to manage a large number of media related requests.

Finding: Joint media teams were a success. Institutionalising this approach, with a standard ToR for joint One Plan teams is imperative with NOs helping identify possible team members.

One team was fielded for photographs and stories and another for video.

Finding: Collaborative tools developed by the media team were successful for coordinating media requests and exposure.

The communications team in Manila developed a number of tools for coordinating media requests and tracking media exposure.

Finding: Some media requests from NOs did not respect either the NGO code of conduct or the rights of vulnerable Children.

Not all media requests made by NO's were appropriate and were therefore not actioned by the communications team.

¹² The evaluation team asked how the staff were expected to get the Children to cry for the camera, and were told that one only had to ask about missing family members or friends to bring on the tears.

PROGRAMME

Is the programme appropriate to the needs of the affected communities, particularly to the most marginalised Children?

To what extent did Plan's own needs assessment add value to the overall needs assessment, and to Plan's programme design, profile and speed of response?

Did we achieve an appropriate geographical and sector scope of programme, given our previous presence in the affected areas?

Can the programme be delivered effectively with the structure and resources available?

Note: the question on addressing needs has been shifted from the systems section to this one.

APPROPRIATENESS

Almost all of the plan programmes visited were broadly appropriate. However the challenge to the appropriateness of the Plan response was timeliness of the interventions. When relief assistance is not timely it runs the risk of no longer being appropriate to current needs (even though it is relevant to the needs at the time of assessment).

While all agencies on the ground faced similar constraints, Plan took longer to overcome them than others. Plan staff complained that they were displaced from communities where they had conducted assessments by other agencies who were able to deliver relief rapidly.

The sequencing of interventions was determined in large part by the supply chain rather than by the priority of needs. Thus if staff had access to kits to support CPiE or EiE, then that was the focus. If they had access to relief goods, then relief distribution was the focus.

Post disaster needs assessment

Any needs assessment after a disaster needs to identify four elements:

1. The nature of the disaster and its likely consequences.
2. The nature of the affected population (livelihoods and capacities etc.).
3. The geographical extent of different levels of damage.
4. The response to the disaster from other actors.

The nature of the disaster and likely consequences is generally well known in the Philippines for typhoons, (although the storm surge and meteo-tsunamis added some complexity here).

The nature of the affected population and their capacities was well known to Plan from its many years of working in the affected areas.

The geographical extent of the disaster was one of the main foci of disaster assessments undertaken by Plan, as the damage to telecommunications was far wider than other types of infrastructural damage. This meant that it took some time for a picture of which areas had been seriously damaged to emerge.

Assessing the response to the disaster by other actors and their likely contribution is always difficult, especially as agency plans change and they do not always deliver what they undertake to do in coordination fora.

This presence of many other actors accounts for one of the major differences between needs assessment in development contexts and in humanitarian response, in that the response to the disaster by other actors (including the affected population) can completely change the nature of outstanding needs. Needs assessments in humanitarian contexts need to be dynamic to account for the changing underlying pattern of unmet needs.

While staff made the initial assessments and identified the need for material relief, Plan was not able to deliver this in a timely fashion to the staff in the field. However, the assessments were still useful as they identified the extent of the affected areas and the overall needs of the population.

When asked, communities rated cash programming, (from Plan or others) as the most useful assistance received, apart from tarpaulins. When it came to cash for work, communities rated projects where people were paid to do things like preparing their land for agriculture, or repairing their latrines, higher than make-work projects like cleaning weeds from the side of the road.

Once Plan set up an effective Logistics mechanism, it delivered a much wider package of assistance than other Organisations. This multi-sector assistance was much appreciated by the affected communities and it reflected Plan's understanding of the situation of the affected population.

JOINT NEEDS ASSESSMENT


Plan undertook joint assessments with other humanitarian agencies and donors. Plan's assessments covered a far larger area than that which Plan eventually decided to work in. Some interviewees criticised the time it took for plan to focus on the area of response, but this is one area where a rapid early decision can leave an agency working in an area which has only marginally been affected. Plan had discounted working in Cebu and Lollo within the first week.

The Plan programme was geographically appropriate, given the response to the disaster from other actors. It was noticeable in some of the Barangays that Plan was working in that few other organisations were assisting at those locations, despite the destruction of livelihoods.

DELIVERY

The grants that Plan was managing at the time of the evaluation were strongly biased towards the initial emergency response. Figure 9 shows that one sixth of all funding has durations of 3 months or less. However, nearly two thirds of grants of funding has a duration of 6 months or less. This front-loading of funding provides a delivery challenge for Plan.

What increased the magnitude of the challenge, is that Plan's activities in month four to six were built around goods, posing further challenges for Plan logistics. Now, some of this is unavoidable (due to



quality issues with roofing sheets etc.), but some of it could have been prevented.

Figure 9: External grant durations and funding levels (from funding tracker of 18 March) - excludes NO funding.

With time, assistance through goods becomes less appropriate as each beneficiary target needs diverged depending on their capacities. This makes cash programming even more appropriate in the later stages of the response.

The programmes with the biggest delivery problems were programmes with significant technical input such as the Unicef Water project and the medical project with the tricycle health clinics. This raises questions about the appropriateness of initiating such projects when Plan did not have the technical staff to initiate them (the Unicef Water project had still not started at the time of the evaluation, some 10 weeks after the contracted start date because of delays in recruitment).

The management of a large and complex programme proved difficult. Plan PH tried a number of different approaches including business-as-usual, and giving the technical advisors responsibility for projects that included their speciality. This was not a success as:

- The technical advisors have previously had an advisory rather than a managerial role, and this new arrangement gave them a management role. This cut across existing line management relationships, and left staff confused.

- The technical advisors had their existing responsibilities, plus cluster coordination responsibilities and advising on the design of new projects. They were unable to take effective control of the new projects (many of which were multi-sectoral).
- There were relatively few technical advisors at the field level, increasing the need for input from the technical advisors for operations at the field level.

The lack of direct project management for the large number of projects in place, and that fact that project details were not communicated to field staff made effective management impossible. Eventually Plan PH assigned project managers with specific responsibility for the projects. This was the best approach.

A related issue here was the Plan PH organisational structure itself was not firmed up completely until the visit of the evaluation team, and even then there were some outstanding issues. While it was clear to the Country Management Team and to Senior National Staff on the ground that international deployments had advisory rather than management roles, this was not always clear to deployed staff. This added to role confusion.

FINDINGS

Finding: Plans programme were broadly appropriate.

Plan delivered in a wide range of sectors. While some suggested that Plan should concentrate narrowly on fewer sectors it could have led to displacement from areas where other agencies were also engaged in providing multi-sector programming.

Finding: Plan carried out effective needs assessments, but these sometimes resulted in no follow up implementation due to other agency's ability to respond faster to the affected area.

Again, the logistics problems in the early stages left Plan lagging behind other agencies in the implementation phase.

Finding: Plan's decision to deliver assistance across a wide range of sectors was appropriate in the circumstances.

Some interviewees suggested that Plan should concentrate on CPiE and EiE in the response and ignore other needs. Others suggested that Plan should concentrate on relief needs and only focus on CPiE and EiE when more urgent needs are met. Involvement in a broad range of sectors ensured that Plan still had a role even where some sectors were catered to by other actors.

Finding: The most troublesome programmes in delivery terms have been those requiring specialist international procurement or the recruitment of technical skills.

Keep it simple is a good rule for emergency response projects.

Finding: Plan PH's effectiveness at mobilising resources for the first six months means that Plan PH will have a difficult task to implement all the planned projects.

Plan's resource mobilisation raised significant funding for the first phase of the response. Many of the projects in this phase featured relief items as part of the project mix.

Finding: The lack of a clear management structure to manage all of the new projects slowed implementation.

Finding: The assignment of project managers without conflicting responsibilities was the correct choice for the management of this large emergency programme by Plan PH.

Plan PH tried a number of options to manage the large number of projects in the response, eventually settling on assigning specific projects managers without conflicting responsibilities.

This is a problem that could re-occur in other emergencies. However, it should be noted that Plan PH's eventual correction and assignment of project managers for each of its programmes, eased staff tensions and clarified roles and responsibilities.

Finding: Plan's relief assistance concentrated too much on relief goods without including the option of replacing them with cash grants as markets recovered.

Ehen staff found that they were waiting for relief goods to distribute, they could instead have used more GOA funds for cash programming. In all, \$600,000 of the GOA was allocated for cash programming in the first six months. This would have provided immediate assistance to the affected population. Even were Municipalities were largely destroyed (e.g. Hernani) shops were still functioning in the adjoining Municipalities.

Finding: Plan PH missed the opportunity to make greater use of cash programming when it faced logistics difficulties.

As discussed in the Supply Chain chapter, Plan's logistics problems slowed implementation. Cash programming could have got around some of these problems. In the Philippines, many families receive remittances. This means that there is an existing infrastructure that can quickly deal with the logistics of cash programming, without the agency having to mount its own supply chain.

FUNDRAISING

Are the fundraising efforts coherent with the sectorial needs on the ground?

How well coordinated were the fundraising efforts within the Plan family for Rapid Response Funds, Appeals and institutional donors?

FUNDRAISING

Plan fundraising for the Typhoon Haiyan response has been a tremendous success by any measure of performance. Plan was uniquely successful at raising money for the Haiyan Response due to:

- How the CD had positioned Plan in the international humanitarian community.
- The good relations enjoyed with the major humanitarian donors.
- A track record of delivering results in other disasters in the Philippines.
- Previous presence in the affected areas.
- The immediate availability of NO staff for deployment with experience in dealing with the main humanitarian donors.
- Plan's willingness to host Donor visits and support other donor activity.

It was suggested by some that resource mobilisation should have been slowed down to better match the implementation capacity, but there are several objections to this:

- It would have damaged relations with donors and make later access to their support more difficult.
- It would have been counter to Plan's corporate decision to engage more with emergency response.
- The basic scale of the problems seen with logistics were such that they would have caused problems even with relatively small amounts of funding. (Plan's logistics operations were predicated on transport and distribution systems working as normal – not a realistic option after the damage caused by the Typhoon).

NO FUNDRAISING

One feature of the Plan systems is that resources mobilised are credited to a particular NO. A NO is credited for its own direct fundraising, and for fundraising from the home Government. Grants from multilateral donors are allocated based on a number of factors, including the NOs input into the grant

proposal. The NOs get votes in proportion to the total amount of fundraising for which they are credited. This arrangement sometimes leads to conflict between NOs on which should be credited with different grants.

National offices account for only \$6.7 million in committed funds. Almost all of this is channelled through the Grant Open to All or GOA. However the Canada NO got agreement from IH to have a separate GAD as well as contribution \$200,000 to the GOA. The reasons for this departure from policy was apparently due to Canadian Accounting Regulations. However, this agreement for a separate GAD was a surprise to the CO, and led to larger problems as other NOs would have also liked to have had separate GADs. Having separate GADs for individual NOs decreased CO flexibility, increased the administrative burden, and was inefficient.

Table 5: NO Contributions to the Philippines response

NO	Value of GAD	GOA?
Germany	2,878,058	GOA
Canada	997,137	Non GOA
Canada	200,000	GOA
Sweden	779,877	GOA
UK	365,947	GOA
Norway	303,105	GOA
Netherlands	275,400	GOA
US	216,288	GOA
Singapore	216,120	GOA
France	186,818	GOA
Ireland	182,023	GOA
Belgium	135,811	GOA
Japan	117,076	GOA
Australia	100,000	GOA
Finland	82,985	GOA
Korea	56,551	GOA
Denmark	46,016	GOA
Switzerland	46,010	GOA
Hong Kong	34,738	GOA
Italy	27,256	GOA

While it has been suggested by some interviewees that the new Global Resource Mobilisation guidelines will eliminate arguments over credit, this idea was regarded as optimistic by others.

Several interviewees commented that NOs were not forthcoming about how much money they had actually raised in their Philippines appeals, and in some cases it was assumed that some countries may have been holding back funds in order to garner donor matching funds. NOs may withhold funding if

they think that they may be able to access national donor funding on a matching funds basis. The problem with matching funds is that if the match is provided from the GOA, this may lead to a particular NO being at an advantage in terms of Credit for fundraising.

FINDINGS

Finding: Plan's fundraising strategy for the Haiyan response was extremely successful. This was due both to its position within the humanitarian community and to the rapid deployment of resource mobilisation staff from the RO and NOs.

This success highlights the importance of positioning plan as a humanitarian response organisation in-country. This means that Plan should be responding to minor disasters in country, even if outside of PUs, and should be building a track record in-country as a humanitarian responder.

Finding: The current rules for assigning credit do not encourage One-Plan behaviour by NOs.

In Plan, voting rights are based on the credit assigned or fundraising. This leads to some issues around willingness of the NOs to contribute to the GOA.

ACCOUNTABILITY

What accountability mechanism is being used to make us accountable to the communities we are working with?

Is there a system for monitoring implementation and tracking of donor funds?

How well has the internal monitoring system contributed to the evaluation and to ongoing programme implementation?

ACCOUNTABILITY

Accountability is typically ensured through constant contact with communities, enabling Plan to get effective feedback on programmes. The evaluation team observed that communities interacted well with Plan staff and were in a good position to provide feedback.

The biggest issue with donor accountability was the lack of documentation of goods and distributions in the early phase of the response. This was partly the result of not having a robust supply chain documentation system, and partially the impact of a lot of personnel changes in a short period. During the evaluation, there was a sustained effort to establish specific allocations in the early stages of the response.

This again highlights the need for training staff in distribution and other systems prior to the emergency. Unlike the normal Plan routine where staff are made aware of the content of each project, and the donor requirements discussed with the staff, projects were launched with very little information. Field staff complained that they were not informed about the different projects, but were just told that goods were arriving and should be distributed.

MONITORING

Plan has a Project Programming Module. In theory this can be used to help monitoring of performance against targets. However, interviewees reported that it was not useful for monitoring, and is more commonly used because to generate Purchase orders.

Monitoring featured the introduction of new technology, with the simple post distribution surveys tied in with geo-locations. The data sample seen related more to satisfaction than with broader issues of the assistance intervention.

Monitoring of a wide range of management information, be it on logistics, secondments, capacity, funding, was carried out using a series of spreadsheets developed by staff to meet their needs. Staff in different sectors developed these spreadsheets to meet their need to have an overview of their elements

of the response. The existence of these spreadsheets suggests that the previous systems used for monitoring were not fit for purpose.

FINDINGS

Finding: Inadequate records were kept in the early stage of the response, making accountability to donors difficult.

The lack of a robust supply chain, the shortage of staff with the needed skills, and issues around the management of the whole emergency programme portfolio meant that records for the early stages of the response were not always kept appropriately.

Finding: Plan's PPM is not fit for purpose for emergency response projects.

Plan has an existing software package for project monitoring. However this was not used.

Finding: The spreadsheets developed by different staff in HR, Logistics, Communications and other functions reflect learning from the response.

These spreadsheets were developed by different staff for their areas of responsibility to respond to the problems with existing tracking tools.

APPENDIX: TERMS OF REFERENCE: REAL TIME EVALUATION OF PLAN INTERNATIONAL'S RESPONSE TO TYPHOON HAIYAN, PHILIPPINES, DECEMBER 2013

1. BACKGROUND

Typhoon Haiyan caused extensive damage to the Philippines, particularly in areas where Plan International have had a long term presence. The international response has been overwhelming, involving all aspects of the international humanitarian system in addition to a full response by all parts of the Philippines Government.

Plan has had significant experience of responding to disasters and of disaster risk reduction in the Philippines. This particular disaster required significant support from across Plan and recruitment of support from outside Plan. Plan's entire programme units were affected, several of them seriously. All Plan's development activities were temporarily suspended while the response was organised. The response centred on areas where Plan had a presence and expanded from there. The original stated ambition for the programme was \$75million over three phases. This may be raised as the scope of rehabilitation funding becomes available.

The programme intends to meet the needs of Children affected by the typhoon Haiyan. Plan is one of the leading NGO's in the Philippines and has one of the strongest field presences in affected areas. Our response has been in Eastern Samar, Western Samar, Camotes Island and Leyte provinces so far. Field teams are in place in Tacloban City in Leyte, Baybay in Leyte, Borongan in East Samar Guiuan and in Manila, Cebu, Tacloban, Baybay, Borongan and Guiuan are being used as logistics hubs.

For the first 2 phases the response will be located in worst affected areas around existing or previous programme units. Initial relief for the first 6 months involves an extensive relief package for 52,000 families including food and non-food items, water and sanitation, protection, education, health, and shelter. A recovery phase up to 18 months will focus on cash, livelihoods, transitional shelter and education. A rehabilitation phase up to 60 months is expected to include education and early childhood care, water and health.

In 2009 Plan International released a Policy and Strategy, symbolising the start of the Plan's investment in disaster risk management. . The following were also launched to support Plan's work:

1. Emergency Line Management procedures – launched in 2010 and revised in 2013
2. Emergency Roster- launched in 2011
3. Disaster Response Manual- launched in July 2012 and revised in 2013
4. A variety of Position Papers

Typhoon Haiyan was the first time that a new manual for emergency response had been used at scale. Plan's standard processes for country, regional and international preparedness were put to the test by this typhoon. Plan's strategy is to respond to the needs of Children in emergencies, building on the expertise in the country, with additional specialisation on education and child protection. This is the first major response since Plan established a food assistance and nutrition unit.

2. EVALUATION PURPOSE

The purpose of this evaluation is to learn from the initial phase of the response. The evaluation will identify lessons to inform the continuing programme and to improve Plan's processes and guidance for preparedness and response to other disasters of this scale.

3. STAKEHOLDERS

The primary stakeholders for the evaluation are the Plan Philippines Country Management Team (for the continuing programme), Regional Office and the Plan Headquarters Disaster Risk Management Team (for processes and guidance). The overall evaluation manager is the Director for Disaster Risk Management in Plan Headquarters.

In the Philippines, the evaluation manager is the Emergency Response Manager, who reports to the country director.

The evaluation should listen to community members; officers from involved local authorities and partners; Plan Philippines staff in programme areas and in the country office; international staff who were deployed in the early phase of the emergency; staff of Plan regional office, headquarters and National offices (i.e. fundraising offices) who were directly involved or concerned.

Plan will appoint an oversight group to review the draft reports. The consultant will report to an evaluation manager.

4. EVALUATION OBJECTIVES AND KEY QUESTIONS

4.1 PREPAREDNESS

1. How effective was the disaster preparedness process in establishing Plan Philippines to be ready for all aspects of the response?

4.2 SYSTEMS AND INTERNAL COORDINATION

1. Have the staff involved in the response followed Plan's procedures for emergency response (as set out in the emergency response manual) and were the procedures in the Manual appropriate to the requirements of a response of this scale?
2. To what extent did other Plan Offices address Philippines needs for the typhoon response?
3. How did the national and international teams complement each other and what was done to promote effective integration?

4. Did the demands from Plan family limit or detract an effective response?
5. Was Plan's investment in ICT support (including the hosting of Nethope) appropriate to the challenges of this disaster?

4.3 EXTERNAL COORDINATION

1. Has Plan's representation and involvement in UN and government (local and national) coordination processes added value to Plan and to others?
2. Is Plan's engagement with local government appropriate and effective?
3. Have Plan established sufficient, appropriate and effective partnerships (with local and international organisations and private sector) to deliver programmes effectively? Did Plan make enough of the opportunities that were available?

4.4 SAFETY AND SECURITY

1. How effectively were issues of staff safety and wellbeing addressed?

4.5 SUPPLY CHAIN MANAGEMENT

1. What were the constraints of Plan's logistics capacity?
2. How could this be addressed to meet programme and funding completion dates?

4.6 MEDIA AND COMMUNICATION

1. To what extent has Plan's media presence enhanced the overall response?

4.7 PROGRAMME PLAN

1. Is the programme appropriate to the needs of the affected communities, particularly to the most marginalised Children?
2. Did we achieve an appropriate geographical and sectoral scope of programme, given our previous presence in the affected areas?
3. Can the programme be delivered effectively with the structure and resources available?
4. To what extent did Plan's own needs assessment add value to the overall needs assessment, and to Plan's programme design, profile and speed of response?

4.8 FUND RAISING

1. Are the fundraising efforts coherent with the sectorial needs on the ground?
2. How well coordinated were the fundraising efforts within the Plan family for Rapid Response Funds, Appeals and institutional donors?

4.9 ACCOUNTABILITY

1. What accountability mechanism is being used to make us accountable to the communities we are working with?
2. Is there a system for monitoring implementation and tracking of donor funds?
3. How well has the internal monitoring system contributed to the evaluation and to ongoing programme implementation?

5. EVALUATION DELIVERABLES AND TIMELINE

The Consulting team must complete the agreed TOR. The following are key milestones;

5.1 INCEPTION REPORT

The inception report will be a scoping exercise for the RTE and will include the proposed methodologies, data collection and reporting plans with draft data collection tools such as interview guides, the allocation of roles and responsibilities within the team, a timeframe with firm dates for deliverables, and the travel and logistical arrangements for the team. A draft of this report should be shared a week before arriving in the country/starting work.

5.2 DEBRIEFINGS / FEEDBACK TO MANAGEMENT AT ALL LEVELS

The team will facilitate a debriefing process to engage the country team's participation as a reflection to help them improve their work, as well identifying lessons for Plan International more widely which link into the evaluators' preliminary top line findings which will further be reflected in the draft report. Further to this, the team or team leader will debrief Director of Disaster Risk Management telephonically, in a timely manner and will adhere to the timeline below.

5.3 DRAFT REPORT

A draft report, identifying key findings, conclusions and lessons for the current and future operation, will be submitted by the team leader at end of 30 days starting the evaluation.

5.4 FINAL REPORT

The final report will contain a short executive summary and a main body of the report covering the background of the intervention evaluated, a description of the evaluation methods and limitations, findings, conclusions and lessons learned. If the evaluation team decide to give any recommendations they should be objective, specific, feasible and no more than 10. The report should also contain appropriate appendices, including a copy of this ToR, cited resources or bibliography, a list of those interviewed and any other relevant materials. The final RTE report will be submitted one week after receipt of the consolidated feedback from Plan. The report should be between 6000-10000 words or 15-20 pages including annexes

Disclaimer: All products arising from this evaluation will be owned by the Plan. The evaluators will not be allowed, without prior authorization in writing, to present any of the analytical results as his / her own work or to make use of the evaluation results for private publication purposes.

Timeline (Please note that this timeline is flexible/negotiable; please get in touch if you have challenges.)

Date	Activity	Deliverable
3-16 December 2013	Tender advertising	Short listing of the team
13-20 December 2013	Selection process	Appointment
7 January 2014	Methodologies and roles	Inception Report
14 Jan 2014	Arrival in Manila	
15 Jan 2014	Initial discussion with CMT	Review and agreement of TOR
*18-29 Jan 2014	Field visit	Data collection
30 Jan 2014	Midway discussion	Progress review
13 Feb 2014	Debriefing	End of mission workshop
15 Feb 2014	Seeking feedback	Draft RTE report
23 Feb 2014	Feedback compilation	Final RTE report

* This could be changed based on CMT/ERM discussion

6. EVALUATION TEAM

The **evaluation team** will consist of two people: an International consultant and a local Philippino staff with extensive knowledge of the humanitarian work in Philippines or locally based team. The team should take all reasonable steps to ensure that the evaluation is designed and conducted to respect and protect the rights and welfare of the people and communities involved and to ensure that the evaluation is technically accurate and reliable, is conducted in a transparent and impartial manner and contributes to organizational learning and accountability. Therefore, the evaluation team should adhere to the following standards:

1. Feasibility: Evaluations must be realistic, diplomatic, and managed in a sensible, cost effective manner.
2. Ethics & Legality: Evaluations must be conducted in an ethical and legal manner, with particular regard for the welfare of those involved in and affected by the evaluation.
3. Impartiality & Independence; Evaluations should be impartial, providing a comprehensive and unbiased assessment that takes into account the views of all stakeholders.
4. Transparency: Evaluation activities should reflect an attitude of openness and transparency.
5. Accuracy: Evaluations should be technical accurate, providing sufficient information about the data collection, analysis, and interpretation methods so that its worth or merit can be determined.
6. Logical and justified: Evaluations should present a clear reasoning, appropriate interpretation of the data and reflect the local context. They should “make sense” in design, information used, interpretation and analysis of data and in conclusions and recommendations.
7. Child Protection: Since the consultants will be in the communities where contact with Children might be possible, the team will be asked to side Plan’s Child Protection Policy.

7. ROLES AND RESPONSIBILITIES:

A. CONSULTANT:

1. Will prepare the inception report
2. Will coordinate with Emergency Response Management Team (ERMT) during the evaluation period
3. Will provide a detailed operational plan and financial quote
4. Will initiate discussion with ERMT at the beginning of the evaluation
5. Maintains strong and effective communication with Plan
6. Adheres to the time frame proposed in section 5 below
7. Complete the agreed TOR and provide a final report

B. PLAN WILL:

1. Develop a TOR for consultant/consulting firm and discuss on the first day of starting work
2. Provide a list of key people to support the evaluation process and a reference point
3. Support the consultants during the evaluation
4. Provide a contract to the service provider
5. manage Consultant and spare time for any meetings as may be required
6. Pay for the services render within 30 days of satisfactory completion of work

8. TERMS & CONDITION:

1. Individual consultants or company will be asked to sign a child protection policy as this is critical for the work that Plan does.
2. A visa letter will be issued where the consultant needs it for immigration purpose
3. No advance will be paid for the work.
4. The assigned consultant/company will organise their transport and accommodation during the process should they visit the international headquarters.
5. The agreed cost will be paid to the recruited consultant/organization after the satisfactory delivery of work upon receipt of letterhead invoice in accordance with Plan payment policies.
6. All consultants/companies will be checked for anti-terrorist before awarding of contract.
7. The above timeline is negotiable.
8. Consultant company/consultants are required to organise their own travel insurance and medical evacuation, Plan will not cover these.

APPENDIX: AREAS IN WHICH PLAN IMPLEMENTED THE RESPONSE




Figure 10: Eastern Samar Target Areas




Figure 11: Samar target areas




Figure 12: Leyte Target Areas

APPENDIX: EVALUATION MATRIX

The evaluation matrix shows how the evaluation team plan to answer the questions specifically raised in the ToR.

Issue	Evaluation Question	Criteria	Sources	Methods
Preparedness	How effective was the disaster preparedness process in establishing Plan Philippines to be ready for all aspects of the response?	Evidence of the extent to which prior disaster preparedness facilitated the Plan response, if at all	Plan PH staff, TDY staff, IH staff	Key informant interviews, on-line survey
Systems and Internal Coordination	Have the staff involved in the response followed Plan's procedures for emergency response (as set out in the emergency response manual) and were the procedures in the Manual appropriate to the requirements of a response of this scale?	Evidence of compliance with the procedures. Little evidence of work arounds	Plan Ph. staff, TDY staff, IH staff	Key informant interviews, on-line survey, document review
Systems and Internal Coordination	To what extend did other Plan Offices address Philippines needs for the typhoon response?	Evidence of the extent to which other Plan offices supported the needs of Plan PH	Plan PH staff, TDY staff, IH staff	Key informant interviews, on-line survey, document review
Systems and Internal Coordination	How did the national and international teams complement each other and what was done to promote effective integration?	Evidence of complementarity and integration.	Plan PH staff, TDY staff, IH staff	Key informant interviews, on-line survey, document review

Issue	Evaluation Question	Criteria	Sources	Methods
Systems and Internal Coordination	Did the demands from Plan family limit or detract an effective response?	Evidence of impact of demands from Plan family	Plan PH staff, TDY staff, IH staff	Key informant interviews, review of GADs
Systems and Internal Coordination	Was Plan's investment in ICT support (including the hosting of Nethope) appropriate to the challenges of this disaster?	Evidence of impact of investment in ICT	Plan PH staff, TDY staff, IH staff, IT staff	Key informant interviews
External Coordination	Has Plan's representation and involvement in UN and government (local and national) coordination processes added value to Plan and to others?	Evidence of added value from Plan's engagement in coordination	Plan PH staff, UN staff, Local Authorities	Key informant interviews, observation, attendance at coordination meetings
External Coordination	Is Plan's engagement with local government appropriate and effective?	Evidence of effectiveness of engagement with local government	Plan PH staff, UN staff, Local Authorities	Key informant interviews, observation
External Coordination	Have Plan established sufficient, appropriate and effective partnerships (with local and international organisations and private sector) to deliver programmes effectively? Did Plan make enough of the opportunities that were available?	Evidence of effective partnerships	Plan PH staff, UN staff, Local Authorities, partners	Key informant interviews, observation

Issue	Evaluation Question	Criteria	Sources	Methods
Safety and Security	How effectively were issues of staff safety and wellbeing addressed?	Evidence of attention to safety and well-being. Evidence of impact of attention to safety and well being	Plan PH staff, TDY staff	Key informant interviews
Supply Chain Management	What were the constraints of Plan's logistics capacity?	Evidence of delays due to logistics constraints	Plan PH staff, TDY staff, IH staff	Key informant interviews, document review, observation
Supply Chain Management	How could this be addressed to meet programme and funding completion dates?	Comparison with other organisations	Plan PH staff, TDY staff, IH staff, other organisation staff, cluster leads	Key informant interviews, document review
Media and Communication	To what extent has Plan's media presence enhanced the overall response?	Evidence that media presence has contributed to response	IH staff, CO staff	Key informant interviews
Programme Plan	Is the programme appropriate to the needs of the affected communities, particularly to the most marginalised Children?	Evidence that the programme is meeting the needs of the most marginalised Children	Affected population, Plan PH staff	Observation, beneficiary interviews, key informant interviews
Programme Plan	Did we achieve an appropriate geographical and sectoral scope of programme, given our previous presence in the affected areas?	Evidence of focus on the most affected areas	Affected population, Plan PH staff	Observation, beneficiary interviews, key informant interviews

Issue	Evaluation Question	Criteria	Sources	Methods
Programme Plan	Can the programme be delivered effectively with the structure and resources available?	Evidence of programme effectiveness and likely on-time completion	Affected population, Plan PH staff	Key informant interviews, document review, observation, assessment of rates of burn and budgets
Programme Plan	To what extent did Plan's own needs assessment add value to the overall needs assessment, and to Plan's programme design, profile and speed of response?	Evidence of needs assessments by Plan which were shared. Evidence of needs assessments impact on programming	Plan PH staff, TDY staff, IH staff, other organisation staff, cluster leads	Key informant interviews, observation, document review
Fund Raising	Are the fundraising efforts coherent with the sectorial needs on the ground?	Evidence of coherence of fundraising efforts (not funding) and sectoral needs	Plan PH staff, TDY staff, IH staff	Document review, key informant interviews
Fund Raising	How well coordinated were the fundraising efforts within the Plan family for Rapid Response Funds, Appeals and institutional donors?	Evidence of non-overlap between the different funding types.	IH staff, CO staff	Key informant interviews, document review
Accountability	What accountability mechanism is being used to make us accountable to the communities we are working with?	Evidence of the existence of effective feedback mechanisms for communities	Plan PH staff, affected population	Key informant interviews, beneficiary interviews, observation

Issue	Evaluation Question	Criteria	Sources	Methods
Accountability	Is there a system for monitoring implementation and tracking of donor funds?	Evidence of active grant tracking	Plan PH staff	Key informant interviews, document review
Accountability	How well has the internal monitoring system contributed to the evaluation and to ongoing programme implementation?	Evidence that the monitoring system data is complete and is being used by managers	Plan staff at all levels.	Key informant interviews, monitoring reports

APPENDIX: METHODOLOGY

The evaluation was conducted in line with the advice offered in the ALNAP pilot guide on the Evaluation of Humanitarian Action (Cosgrave and Smith, 2013).

The evaluation relied mainly on the following

- Key informant interviews
- Group interviews with Plan staff
- Group interviews with the affected population
- Document review
- Observation
- On-line survey

UNDERLYING STANDARDS

The team used the Sphere Standards (Sphere Project, 2011) and the related companion standards (Child Protection Working Group, 2012; INEE, 2010; LEGS Project, 2009; The SEEP Network, 2010) as the benchmark for Plan's intended level of performance. However, this RTE was focused on learning, and is not a standard's compliance review.

KEY INFORMANT INTERVIEWS (INCLUDING TELEPHONE INTERVIEWS)

Key informant interviews will be one of the principle sources for the evaluation. We expect that key informant interviews will be a critical source of information given that key staff will not have had the time to summarise lessons in documents

We interviewed:

- International headquarters (IH) staff
- Regional Office (RO) staff
- County Office (CO) staff
- National Office (NO) staff
- Temporary Duty staff
- Other Plan PH staff, including long-serving staff and new hires
- Cluster leads

- Local authorities including Provincial, City, Municipal, and Barangay officials
- Staff from other humanitarian organisations

Plan staff were also surveyed through an online survey. Interviews were conducted under a modification of the Chatham House Rule (Chatham House, 2007) whereby nothing that interviewees say will be directly or indirectly attributed to them without their express consent. The team will also, when opportunity presents, conduct group interviews with beneficiaries to gather their perspective on issues of access. The interviews will be conducted using the interviews guide annexed to this inception report.

GROUP INTERVIEWS WITH PLAN STAFF

The team conducted a series of group interviews with Plan national staff, this began found to be more efficient than individual interviews. Paradoxically, the team found that comments made by National staff in group settings were more frank than individual interviews¹³, except where the individual interviews were conducted without the non-Philippine team member.

GROUP INTERVIEWS WITH THE AFFECTED POPULATION

The team will conduct group interviews with the affected population to ask them about their experience of assistance from Plan. These will not be conducted as focus-group discussions as the team want to interview as many groups as possible and over a wider range of topics than would be possible in a focus-group interview. These types of group interviews are sometimes called Focus Group Discussions, but the team reserve this term for the more formal setting described in (Krueger and Casey, 2009).

DOCUMENT REVIEW

The team has already reviewed a number of documents supplied by Plan and continues to review documents posted to the Virtual Operations Centre website. The documents of most interest are downloaded and indexed to allow them to be searched quickly for different themes (such as geographical searches). The team will continue to add documents during the fieldwork.

There is no intent to conduct a general trawl through all the correspondence or to impose a load on the Plan team in country by looking for extensive sets of documents. Documents from the broader humanitarian community (of which 2,000 have already been published on ReliefWeb) will only be consulted if there is some specific reference to Plan in the document or interviewees specifically refer to the document.

¹³ The reverse is usually the case, and may reflect the reinforcing effect of colleagues against the dampening effect of having a non-Philippino on the evaluation team.




Figure 13: Postings to Relief Web about Typhoon Haiyan in the Philippines

Observation was a key source of triangulation data, to confirm or not the data obtained from interviews and documents. The team directly observed Plan staff in operation in the field, as well as observing the situation of the affected population. This led to conclusion about the relative volume of activity by the National Government and NGOs in the response, as well as confirming the good relations between plan and the Community.

ON-LINE SURVEY


The team placed a survey online. The main focus of the survey was to gather opinions on how well Plan systems and coordination function in the response. The main target for the survey National Organisation staff and other international deployed staff (as these would be the least well represented in country interviews). However, the survey also had questions for CO and NO staff. The survey was in English only.

The survey was hosted on SurveyMonkey. It can be seen at:

<https://www.surveymonkey.com/s/ClosedRTESurvey>.

There were 126 respondents for the survey. A few of the respondents may have been duplicated when staff accidentally closed the survey while completing it (only two responses did not have replies to the final few questions). What was surprising with the survey was that so many of those responding made detailed comments in the comment boxes. Typically, in such surveys, only a small percentage of respondents complete the comment boxes, regardless of how broad the scoring questions are.

Figure 14: Respondents to the online survey (126 in total, of whom 6 did not indicate where they normally worked)



Although the Plan Philippines staff were the largest group of survey respondents, they only represented 38% of the respondents, with 62% coming from Plan offices outside the Philippines.

SAMPLING STRATEGY

The team used a purposive sampling strategy, focusing on those expected to be able to provide the greatest amount of information for the team. However the team also sampled extensively, to ensure that the results of the evaluation are seen to be grounded in a wide range of interviewees.

FIELDWORK

Following briefing at the CO Manila, the team travelled to Leyte and Eastern Samar for fieldwork. The team visited the Plan offices at:

- Manila (CO and ARO)
- BayBay
- Tacloban
- Borongan
- Guiuan



Figure 15: Field travel by the Evaluation Team (not all site trips to Barangays in Leyte are shown).

An appendix contains a detailed itinerary for the team. The fieldwork was preceded and followed by interviews in Manila and by telephone interviews elsewhere.

TRIANGULATION.

Triangulation is critical in mixed method research to ensure reliability and validity. The team used triangulation to ensure that the findings of the evaluation are valid and reliable. We used the following types of triangulation:

- Source triangulation. We compared information from different sources, e.g. different levels of Plan staff, Government officials, and other humanitarian actors.
- Method triangulation: We will compare information collected by different methods, e.g. interviews and observation for example.

DATA CODING AND ANALYSIS

While the quantitative data collected will be relatively straightforward to analyse, qualitative data is more difficult. The team adopted a rigorous approach for the analysis of qualitative data. The team did this through coding all the qualitative data (interviews, observations, and survey comments) in a simple

evidence tool¹⁴. The evidence tool has a number of components including a coding sheet for the evidence (Table 6), and a table of sources of evidence (Table 7).

Table 6: Evidence Coding Sheet headings

Principal Code	Details of piece of evidence	Source ID	New?	2ndry Code
What ToR question or issue identified in the inception phase does this piece of evidence relate to	Evidence about this issue (this could be a note of a specific point from a document, an interview, a focus group or an observation).	A unique identifier identifying the source of the evidence	Flag to identify new themes (to identify data saturation)	If needed to recode the data or refine the coding

Table 7: Evidence Source table headings

Source ID	Details of the source	Date	Category	Type	Who
A unique identifier for the source e.g. – IH-IV1 – SR12 etc.	Details of the source – the person interviewed, the specific focus group or document etc.	The data of data collection	Whether the source is from CO/IH/RO/PU or other	Document, interview etc.	Team member entering the data from this source

The tool was used to record the sources of information, but even without this the sources may sometimes be evident from the specifics of the evidence. Therefore, the tool remains internal to the team, in order not to breach the Chatham House rule under which the interviews are conducted.

¹⁴ This tool was developed by the team leader in 2007. An earlier version of the tool was described in New Directions in Evaluation (Brusset et al., 2010).

APPENDIX: PERSONS MET

The team interviewed 145 people in total. The majority of these were in group interviews. There was a good gender balance overall, with 71 female interviewees and 74 male interviewees.

Type of interview method	Type		as %	Of which ♀	♀ as %
Semi-structured Interview (Individual interviewee)	ssi	9	6%	4	44%
Semi-structured Interview (Group - two or more interviewees)	ssg	114	79%	62	54%
Detailed discussion (more than ten minutes on one or more topics)	dd	2	1%	0	
Telephone interview	ti	20	13%	5	25%
Total		145	100%	71	49%

The list of those interviewees is as follows:

Surname, Forenames	Org. and function	♂♀	Method	Date
Abella, Isabel	Municipal Planning & Devt Coordinator, Salcedo, Easter Samar	♀	ssg	Wed 12 Feb
Abrera, Nitz	Plan, Masbate PU Supervisor, deployed to Leyte	♀	ssg	Fri 14 Feb
Acibar, Teresita	Plan, ESPU, Field Finance Staff	♀	ssg	Sun 16 Feb
Acibar, Tess	Plan ESPU, Finance Staff from NSPU	♀	ssg	Sun 16 Feb
Afable, Estelita	East Samar Provincial Govt, Prov.Social Welfare Officer	♀	ssg	Tue 18 Feb
Aftab Alam, Syed Mohammed	Plan	♂	ti	Wed 26 Feb
Allen, Dena	Plan NO	♀	ti	Wed 26 Feb
Alvarado, Ariel	Brgy. Jagnaya, Salcedo, East Samar, CFSV- DCW	♂	ssg	Mon 17 Feb
Alvarez, Michelle	Plan ESPU, General Protection Officer (newly hired)	♀	ssg	Sun 16 Feb
Anastacio, Reynaldo	Plan, ESPU, General Services Staff	♂	ssg	Sun 16 Feb
Ang, Flor	Plan,SLPU, Finance Staff, deployed to Leyte	♀	ssg	Wed 12 Feb
Arago, Jeremy Aaron	Plan, ESPU, Logistics Assistant	♂	ssg	Sun 16 Feb
Avila, Jennylina	Dagami, Leyte, Mun. Welfare and Devt Officer	♀	ssg	Wed 12 Feb
Ayon, Darwin	Plan, ESPU, General ServicesStaff	♂	ssg	Sun 16 Feb
Babarino, Alipio	Brgy Villarasas, Dagami, Leyte, Brgy Councilor	♂	ssg	Thu 13 Feb
Bagon, Noel	Brgy. Jagnaya, Salcedo, East Samar, P. Leader	♂	ssg	Mon 17 Feb
Balangkit, Paz	Brgy. Jagnaya, Salcedo, East Samar, Cash for Work - Plan	♀	ssg	Mon 17 Feb
Balbaniro, Rowena	Brgy Villarasas, Dagami, Leyte, Child Friendly Space Volunteer	♀	ssg	Thu 13 Feb
Baldwin, Max	Plan, Resource Mobilisation Specialist	♂	ti	Wed 22 Jan
Barrido, Diana Rose	Brgy Mag Aso, Master Teacher 1	♀	ssg	Thu 13 Feb
Base, Shiena	Plan ESPU, Community Development Facilitator from NSPU	♀	ssg	Sun 16 Feb
Beckett, Brian	Plan RO	♂	ti	Wed 26 Feb
Bello, Marcelina	Brgy. Jagnaya, Salcedo, East Samar, Resident	♀	ssg	Mon 17 Feb
Bello,Marietta	Brgy. Jagnaya, Salcedo, East Samar, Brgy Captain	♀	ssg	Mon 17 Feb
Berenger, Roland	Plan	♂	ti	Thu 27 Feb

Surname, Forenames	Org. and function	♂♀	Method	Date
Bergsma, Tijkpe	Plan, Deputy CEO	♂	ti	Thu 23 Jan
Bhattacharyya, Dipayan	WFP Philippines, Head of Food Security	♂	ssi	Mon 10 Feb
Binatac, Leo	Brgy Villarasas, Dagami, Leyte, Brgy Councilor	♂	ssg	Thu 13 Feb
Boeckler, Fabian	Plan NO	♂	ti	Thu 27 Feb
Buenafe, Honorio,Jr.	Plan, ESPU, General Services Staff	♂	ssg	Sun 16 Feb
Bullo, Joselito	Plan, ESPU, Emergency Logistician (newly hired)	♂	ssg	Sun 16 Feb
Cabus, Jimmy	Brgy Villarasas, Dagami, Leyte, Brgy Councilor	♂	ssg	Thu 13 Feb
Cabus, Rogelio,Sr.	Brgy. Jagnaya, Salcedo, East Samar, Cash for Work - UNDP	♂	ssg	Mon 17 Feb
Cachuela, Erwin	Plan, SLPU CDF, deployed to Leyte	♂	ssg	Fri 14 Feb
Caducio, Jhonvey	Brgy Villarasas, Dagami, Leyte, Brgy Security Volunteer	♂	ssg	Thu 13 Feb
Campomanos, Maricel	Plan, Visayas Support Center, Tacloban, General Services	♀	ssg	Sat 15 Feb
Carvalho, Luiza	UN RC/HC/RR/DO	♀	ti	Fri 21 Feb
Carzano, Elisa	Plan ESPU, Early Childhood Care and Devt Officer	♀	ssg	Sun 16 Feb
Castell, Olle	Plan	♂	ti	Wed 26 Feb
Castimiano, Ginalyn	Plan, ESPU, Field Finance Monitor	♀	ssg	Sun 16 Feb
Cinco, Blenchie	Plan, ESPU, Finance Staff	♀	ssg	Sun 16 Feb
Cornejo, Cecil	Plan ESPU, Research & Evaluation from CO	♀	ssg	Sun 16 Feb
Crawford, Garreth	Plan, Emergency Manager	♂	ti	Thu 16 Jan
Cunningham, Emma	Brgy Mag Aso, Brgy Council Chairwoman	♀	ssg	Thu 13 Feb
Cushing, Chris	Plan	♂	ti	Wed 26 Feb
Delusa, Abundi	Mayor, Dagami, Leyte	♂	ssg	Wed 12 Feb
Desolu, Lampo	Brgy Asgad, Salcedo, Eastern Samar, Brgy Captain	♂	ssg	Mon 17 Feb
Devilla, Jojo	Plan ESPU, Emergency Unit Manager from NSPU	♀	ssg	Sun 16 Feb
Dupal-ag, Jessie M	Plan, SLPU CDF, deployed to Leyte	♀	ssg	Fri 14 Feb
Dura, Danila	Municipal Enviroment and Netural Resources Officer,Salcedo	♂	ssg	Mon 17 Feb
Dy, Ronie S	Plan, SLPU CDF, deployed to Leyte	♂	ssg	Fri 14 Feb
Edades, Maria Ella	Brgy. Jagnaya, Salcedo, East Samar, CFSV- DCW	♀	ssg	Mon 17 Feb
Elegado, Edwin	Plan Philippines, Program Information Manager	♂	ssi	Mon 10 Feb
Ero, Chona	Brgy Mag Aso, Brgy Council Member	♀	ssg	Thu 13 Feb
Espadero, Jenick	Plan ESPU, Community Development Facilitator	♂	ssg	Sun 16 Feb
Eusebio, Imelda	Dagami, Leyte, Mun. Rural Sanitary Inspector	♀	ssg	Wed 12 Feb
Felicin, Crisanta	Brgy Asgad, Salcedo, Eastern Samar, Brgy Health Worker	♀	ssg	Mon 17 Feb
Felicin, Lilia	Brgy Asgad, Salcedo, Eastern Samar, Volunteer	♀	ssg	Mon 17 Feb
Fernandez, Lilibeth	Plan ESPU, Area Supervisor from Mindoro PU	♀	ssg	Sun 16 Feb
Fortich, Selena	Plan Philippines, CPA for Child Protection	♀	ssi	Mon 10 Feb
Gabrino, Lami	Brgy Mag Aso, Brgy Council Member	♀	ssg	Thu 13 Feb
Gagante, Magdalena	Brgy Asgad, Salcedo, Eastern Samar, Cash for Work	♀	ssg	Mon 17 Feb
Gayales,Vicente	Brgy. Jagnaya, Salcedo, East Samar, Brgy Tanod	♂	ssg	Mon 17 Feb
Gaytos, Nora	Municipal Sanitary Inspector, Salcedo, EasterSamar	♀	ssg	Mon 17 Feb
Gernale, Ilorde	Brgy Villarasas, Dagami, Leyte, Brgy Security Volunteer	♂	ssg	Thu 13 Feb
Grado, Roel	Brgy Sto. Nino, Brgy Council Member	♂	ssg	Thu 13 Feb

Surname, Forenames	Org. and function	♂♀	Method	Date
Guasis, Margarito	Plan, ESPU, Team Leader from Typhoon Bopha Response (Mindanao)	♂	ssg	Sun 16 Feb
Guevarra, Frank	Plan ESPU, Area Supervisor from WSPU	♂	ssg	Sun 16 Feb
Hilton, Nick	Plan Philippines, Logistics Information Management	♂	ssg	Tue 11 Feb
Iglesias, Jake	Plan ESPU, Community Development Facilitator	♂	ssg	Sun 16 Feb
Ilego, Letecia	Brgy Asgad, Salcedo, Eastern Samar, Brgy Secretary	♀	ssg	Mon 17 Feb
Juat, Myrna	Plan Philippines, Emergency Response Human Resources	♀	ssg	Tue 11 Feb
Keller, Anna	Plan	♀	ti	Fri 28 Feb
Krishnan, Unni	Plan	♂	ti	Mon 03 Mar
Lacamaru, Alejandro	Brgy. Jagnaya, Salcedo, East Samar, Resident	♂	ssg	Mon 17 Feb
Lace, Gorgonio	Brgy Asgad, Salcedo, Eastern Samar, Brgy Council Member	♂	ssg	Mon 17 Feb
Lace, Nelson	Brgy Asgad, Salcedo, Eastern Samar, Cash for Work	♂	ssg	Mon 17 Feb
Lactawan, Estrella	Brgy. Jagnaya, Salcedo, East Samar, Brgy Secretary	♀	ssg	Mon 17 Feb
Lactawan, Loreena	Brgy. Jagnaya, Salcedo, East Samar, Cash for Work - UNDP	♀	ssg	Mon 17 Feb
Lactayaba, Pablo	Brgy. Jagnaya, Salcedo, East Samar, FAGABYACAP	♂	ssg	Mon 17 Feb
Lalina, Nelda	Brgy Sto. Nino, Brgy Council Treasurer	♀	ssg	Thu 13 Feb
Linggas, Buboy	Plan, NSPU Supervisor, deployed to Leyte	♂	ssg	Fri 14 Feb
Loberiano, Cynthia	Brgy Asgad, Salcedo, Eastern Samar, Child Friendly Space Volunteer	♀	ssg	Mon 17 Feb
Lorejas, Rolando A	Plan, NSPU CDF, deployed to Leyte	♂	ssg	Fri 14 Feb
Macasa, Ma.Amelita	Municipal Social & Devt Officer, Salcedo, Easter Samar	♀	ssg	Mon 17 Feb
Madrid, Zenaida	Brgy Asgad, Salcedo, Eastern Samar, Child Friendly Space Volunteer	♀	ssg	Mon 17 Feb
Malabayabas, Nonito	Plan ESPU, General Services Officer from Occidental Mindoro PU	♂	ssg	Sun 16 Feb
Mamanglo, Diana	Plan ESPU, Monitoring & Evaluation Officer (newly hired)	♀	ssg	Sun 16 Feb
Mananito, Nenita	Brgy Villarosas, Dagami, Leyte, Brgy Councilor	♀	ssg	Thu 13 Feb
Mandaba, Manny	Plan Philippines, Head of Monitoring and Evaluation	♂	dd	Mon 10 Feb
Manfredi, Frank	Plan RO RD	♂	ti	Thu 27 Feb
Martin, Edgar	Plan, Mindoro PU Supervisor, deployed to Leyte	♂	ssg	Fri 14 Feb
McDough, Joseph	Plan, Special Project, Tacloban, Climate Change Adaptation Manager	♂	ssg	Sat 15 Feb
Melgar, Melchor	Mayor, Salcedo, Eastern Samar	♂	ssg	Wed 12 Feb
Montilla, Veronica	Brgy Villarosas, Dagami, Leyte, Brgy Treasurer	♀	ssg	Thu 13 Feb
Morante, Leo	Brgy Mag Aso, Brgy Council Member	♂	ssg	Thu 13 Feb
Morella, Irma	Plan, OMPU CDF, deployed to Leyte	♀	ssg	Fri 14 Feb
Morgan, Justine	Oxfam Philippines, Country Director	♂	ssi	Fri 14 Feb
Mudasser	Plan	♂	ti	Wed 26 Feb
Narvasa, Melanie	Plan ESPU, Sponsorship Officer from ESPU	♀	ssg	Sun 16 Feb
Nicart, Alice	East Samar Provincial Govt, Philippine Information Agency	♀	ssg	Tue 18 Feb
Nicart, Levy	East Samar Provincial Govt, PDRRM Officer	♂	ssg	Tue 18 Feb
Novela, Wilfredo	Plan ESPU, Community Development Facilitator	♂	ssg	Sun 16 Feb

Surname, Forenames	Org. and function	♂♀	Method	Date
Obdullada, Clarita	Brgy Asgad, Salcedo, Eastern Samar, Resident	♀	ssg	Mon 17 Feb
Oledan, Philip Ariane	Plan ESPU, Community Development Facilitator(newly hired)	♂	ssg	Sun 16 Feb
Olguera, Vergelita	Brgy Villarasos, Dagami, Leyte, Brgy Councilor	♀	ssg	Thu 13 Feb
Paragas, Jylci Anne	Plan, ESPU, Field Finance Monitor	♀	ssg	Sun 16 Feb
Payud, Leah	Plan ESPU, Area Supervisor	♀	ssg	Sun 16 Feb
Prigula, Jose	Brgy Villarasos, Dagami, Leyte, Brgy Security Volunteer	♂	ssg	Thu 13 Feb
Pristupa, Kristin	Plan Philippines, former NO deployee, currently ECHO Program Manager	♀	ssg	Mon 10 Feb
Querido, Michelle	Plan ESPU, Technical Officer for Nutrition	♀	ssg	Sun 16 Feb
Ranit, Adam	Brgy Asgad, Salcedo, Eastern Samar, Brgy Council Member	♂	ssg	Mon 17 Feb
Ranit, Jaime, Jr.	Brgy Asgad, Salcedo, Eastern Samar, Brgy Council Member	♂	ssg	Mon 17 Feb
Regional HR, Claire Condilac,	Plan RO HR	♀	ti	Fri 21 Feb
Remorosa, Maria Victoria P	Plan, SLPU CDF, deployed to Leyte	♀	ssg	Fri 14 Feb
Rentaza, Albert	Brgy Villarasos, Dagami, Leyte, Brgy Councilor	♂	ssg	Thu 13 Feb
Robino, Pacita	Brgy Sto. Nino, Brgy Council Chairperson	♀	ssg	Thu 13 Feb
Robles, Analisa	Plan ESPU, Education in Emergencies Officer	♀	ssg	Sun 16 Feb
Rodrigo, Raquel	Brgy Sto. Nino, Brgy Council Secretaty	♀	ssg	Thu 13 Feb
Roughneen, Dualta	Plan NO	♂	ti	Wed 26 Feb
Sabido, Pacita	Brgy. Jagnaya, Salcedo, East Samar, Brgy Council Member	♀	ssg	Mon 17 Feb
Sabugdalan, Ronaldo	Brgy Sto. Nino, Brgy Council Member	♂	ssg	Thu 13 Feb
Sabulao, Ma. Analiza	Plan, ESPU, Field Finance Monitor	♀	ssg	Sun 16 Feb
Sagales, Norma	Brgy Asgad, Salcedo, Eastern Samar, Resident	♀	ssg	Mon 17 Feb
Sandison, Richard	Plan Philippines, Emergency Response Manager	♂	dd	Mon 10 Feb
Sanoy, Prudence	Plan Philippines, CPA for Education	♀	ssi	Mon 10 Feb
Sawaan, Fresco	Brgy Asgad, Salcedo, Eastern Samar, Resident	♂	ssg	Mon 17 Feb
Sawaan, Rolly	Brgy Asgad, Salcedo, Eastern Samar, Brgy Council Member	♂	ssg	Mon 17 Feb
Seco, Cathy	Plan Philippines, Grants Managers	♀	ssg	Mon 10 Feb
Seleem, Asim	Plan	♂	ti	Wed 26 Feb
Silorio, Naty	Plan Philippines, Visayas Area Manager	♀	ssg	Fri 14 Feb
Sumaylo, Chris	Plan, Visayas Support Center, Tacloban, IT Specialist	♂	ssg	Sat 15 Feb
Sy, William	Plan Philippines, Supply Chain Manager	♂	ssg	Tue 11 Feb
Talawgan, Ronld	Plan, NSPU Supervisor, deployed to Leyte	♂	ssg	Fri 14 Feb
Tebbrero, Eva	Brgy. Jagnaya, Salcedo, East Samar, CFSV- DCW	♀	ssg	Mon 17 Feb
Teglo, Rosalinda	Plan, ESPU, Field Finance Monitor	♀	ssg	Sun 16 Feb
Tiempo, Zuriel Marx	Plan, ESPU, Finance(Grants)	♂	ssg	Sun 16 Feb
Tong, Katie	Plan	♀	ti	Wed 26 Feb
van der Hor, Carin	Plan Philippines, Country Director	♀	ssi	Mon 10 Feb
Wana, Dong	Plan Philippines, Program Support Manager	♂	ssi	Mon 10 Feb
Waniwan, Juanito	President, Association of Brgy Captains, Salcedo, Easter Samar	♂	ssg	Mon 17 Feb

Surname, Forenames	Org. and function	♂♀	Method	Date
Winartasaputra, Hilda	Plan Asia, Regional WASH Advisor	♀	ssi	Tue 11 Feb
Yamsuan, Erwin	Plan Philippines, Program Information Manager	♂	ssi	Mon 10 Feb
Yaqub, Haider	Plan RO DRD	♂	ti	Fri 28 Feb
Yevez, Marcos	Brgy Villarasos, Dagami, Leyte, Brgy Councilor	♂	ssg	Thu 13 Feb

APPENDIX: INTERVIEW GUIDE

The following interview guide used was generic – some questions will be inappropriate for particular interviewee types and will therefore not be asked of that type of interviewee.

Question
Can you tell us a little about your involvement with the Yolanda response?
What, if any, aspects of prior preparedness by Plan affected your work in the response?
Are you familiar with the Plan Manual for emergency response? To what extent did you use it? What is your overall view of the manual?
How would you characterise the support you got from other Plan offices? Did this change over time? Did it meet the need of the response?
How well did the national and international team complement each other's skills and experience? What was done to create synergy?
How did any demands from the broader Plan family affect your work?
To what extent did ICT support contribute to your work?
To what extent did engagement with UN coordination add value for Plan? To what extent did engagement with government add value for Plan?
To what extent was engagement with local government appropriate? To what extent was such engagement effective?
To what extent did local and international partnerships to deliver programmes effectively? To what extent did Plan make use of the available opportunities for partnership?
To what extent did Plan pay attention to issues of Staff Safety and Wellbeing?
To what extent was your work impacted by the constraints of Plan Logistics?
If your work was affected by logistics constraints, how could these constraints be addressed in future?
What impact did Plan's media presence on the response?
To what extent does the programme focus on the most vulnerable, especially marginalised Children?
To what extent was the choice of sectors and areas to intervene appropriate (given Plan's previous geographical engagement)

Given the current structure and scale of resources, how much of the programme do you expect that Plan will be able to deliver.
To what extent were you engaged in, or did you use any Plan needs assessments? Were Plan needs assessments shared with others? To what extent were they incorporated in the programme? To what extent were needs assessment too late for incorporation?
To what extent is Plan fundraising from the critical areas of need?
To what extent has Plan family fundraising been coherent with fundraising from institutions?
To what extent were the affected population engaged in: the design of the plan response; the selection of beneficiaries; monitoring Plan activities? What formal mechanisms are there for individuals or the community to raise concerns with Plan?
How are you tracking implementation? How are you tracking donor funds? Which donor funded what you are doing today?
To what extent have you been able to use monitoring data to plan implementation?
If you were doing this again, with what you now know, What would you do differently?
We are talking to Plan staff (CO, IH, RO, TDY, and field staff), local authorities, cluster leads, other humanitarian organisations, and the affected population. Whom else do you suggest we talk to?
In terms of individuals, whom do you suggest would be most worth our while to talk to?
Finally, are there any areas that you are surprised we have not asked you about?

APPENDIX: ON-LINE SURVEY

Topic	Question	Sub elements	Responses
Prior preparedness by Plan	To what extent was your work in the response affected by:	<p>The staff roster</p> <p>The Plan Emergency Procedures manual</p> <p>Prior training in Plan</p> <p>Prior disaster simulations</p> <p>Prior disaster experience</p>	<p>Not at all</p> <p>To some extent</p> <p>To a moderate extent</p> <p>To a great extent</p> <p>Not applicable/don't know</p>
	Can you give detail any examples of the impact or prior preparedness by Plan on the response (leave blank if none)?		Text Box
Plan manual	How well would you agree with the following statements about the Plan Emergency Manual	<p>I am familiar with the manual</p> <p>I used it during the response</p> <p>The manual was very useful to me</p> <p>The manual is a good fit with Plan's needs in an emergency</p> <p>The manual needs a lot of revision</p>	<p>Strongly disagree</p> <p>Disagree</p> <p>Neither agree nor disagree</p> <p>Agree</p> <p>Strongly agree</p> <p>Not applicable/don't know</p>
	Which part of the manual was most useful for you	(Note: possibly add thumbnails of typical page from manuals)	<p>Volume 1: The WHAT of disasters</p> <p>Volume 2: Roles and</p>

			Responsibilities Volume 3: Core programme chapters and cross cutting issues
	Why do you say this?		Text Box
	Have you any suggestions for improving the manual?		Text Box
Support from other offices	How well would you agree with the following statements about the Plan Emergency Manual	<p>The support from other Plan offices was very helpful</p> <p>Other Plan offices too often concentrated on their own agendas</p> <p>Other Plan offices were sometimes too demanding</p> <p>Other Plan offices gave us timely support</p> <p>Other Plan offices placed large demands on our time</p> <p>Other Plan offices enabled us to effectively assist the affected population</p>	<p>Strongly disagree</p> <p>Disagree</p> <p>Neither agree nor disagree</p> <p>Agree</p> <p>Strongly agree</p> <p>Not applicable/don't know</p>
	Which type of Plan office:	<p>Was most helpful to you in the response</p> <p>Was the most difficult to deal with</p> <p>Consumed most of your time?</p>	<p>PH CO</p> <p>ARO</p> <p>IH</p> <p>Other CO</p> <p>NO</p>

			ARO Other Plan Office Not applicable, Don't know
	Are there any general comments you wish to make on the support provided by other Plan offices		Text box
Team Synergy	How well would you agree with the following statements about different types of Plan staff	<p>Temporary Duty International staff brought essential skills to the response</p> <p>Some temporary duty international staff added little to the response</p> <p>The lack of context knowledge of some temporary duty international staff led to programming problems</p> <p>Existing Plan PH staff already had a good knowledge of disaster response</p> <p>Existing Plan PH staff were well aware of Plan procedures</p> <p>New hires got an adequate briefing on Plan</p> <p>National and international Team</p>	<p>Strongly disagree</p> <p>Disagree</p> <p>Neither agree nor disagree</p> <p>Agree</p> <p>Strongly agree</p> <p>Not applicable/don't know</p>

		member worked well together	
	What type of staff (in terms of vocation or skills) was most lacking from Plan in your view		Text box
	Any other comments on staff issues		Text Box
	Any other general comments about Plan's Yolanda response		Text Box
About you	What category best describes you		Plan IH staff Plan ARO staff Plan PH CO staff Plan PH Pu staff Plan PH other staff Plan NO staff Plan staff from another programme
	What roles did you fill in the Yolanda response		Working on Yolanda from outside Plan PH Temporary deployment to Plan PH for Yolanda Plan PH staff (employed before Yolanda) Plan PH staff (employed since Yolanda)
	Is your normal designation		National staff International staff

	Gender		Female Male
	Age Group		Under 25 25-40 40-55 Over 55
	Years with plan		Less than one One to three Four to Ten Over Ten

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